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ABSTRACT
Creditors have long understood that any claims they submit for repayment in a bankruptcy 
might be valid, but subject to subordination in the order of payment of the bankruptcy estate’s 
limited funds if the creditor behaved inequitably as the debtor failed.  A groundbreaking opinion in 
Enron’s on-going bankruptcy has expanded the practice of equitable subordination far beyond its 
traditional reach.  According to the court, buyers of bankruptcy claims are now subject to 
subordination, not just for their own conduct, but also for conduct of previous owners of the claims, 
regardless of whether the conduct related to the claims.  
 
In a world of active bankruptcy claims trading, Enron raises powerful policy questions about 
the legal rules governing property transfers that affect the doctrinal development of bankruptcy law 
and the survival of a secondary market that provides important liquidity to other capital markets.  
This article shows how Enron was erroneous from both doctrinal and policy perspectives and 
examines the problems Enron has created for several distinct markets.  
 
Enron is a reminder of the continuing value of negotiability in commercial contexts, for if the 
claims involved had been negotiable, they could not have been subordinated.  Thus, this article 
considers what factors have traditionally determined when the law adopts a negotiability regime for 
property transfers and whether these factors make sense in today’s financial markets.  The article 
argues that in the bankruptcy claims context, the liquidity benefits of negotiability outweigh its costs.  
Accordingly, the article proposes a federal law of negotiability for bankruptcy claims to protect the 
liquidity of this vital market.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy claims trading is the buying and selling by creditors of claims against a bankrupt 
corporate debtor.1 Although it has gone largely unnoticed by courts and legal scholars, the growth of 
bankruptcy claims trading has been the most important development in corporate reorganizations in 
the past two decades. 2 Bankruptcy claims trading is now a major, although virtually unregulated, 
financial industry.3 Specialized firms with expertise in valuing and diversifying the risk of investing 
in bankrupt companies assist the largely institutional investors—hedge funds and investment 
banks—who are active players in the claims market.  Although the exact size of the corporate 
bankruptcy claims trading market is unknown, it has been estimated to be in the hundreds of billions 
of dollars about a decade ago, and has seen a prodigious growth in recent years.4
The growth of the bankruptcy claims trading market stems from the risks and delays inherent 
in large Chapter 11 bankruptcies.  Creditors can wait for years to receive a payout in a large Chapter 
11 case, and the expected payout at the end is highly speculative.  The ability to sell bankruptcy 
claims provides an exit opportunity for creditors who do not wish to incur the hassle and expense of 
the reorganization process.  The ability to buy bankruptcy claims provides non-creditors an 
 
1 There is also a significant market in personal bankruptcy claims.  Typically these claims are sold in bundles that include 
claims against multiple debtors, such as the sale of a segment of a credit card company’s loan portfolio.   The claim 
buyers are not looking to purchase claims against any particular debtor, but are purchasing something more akin to a 
fund of claims.  There are unique policy considerations to personal bankruptcy claims trading that place it beyond the 
scope of this article.    
2 Glenn E. Siegel, Introduction, ABI Guide to Trading Claims in Bankruptcy: Part 2, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 177 
(2003). 
3 The sole industry-specific regulation is FED R. BANKR. P. 3001, which requires that proof of certain claims transfers be 
filed with the court. Id. 
4 E.g., Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1684, 1685 (1996) (noting estimate of the 
claims trading market “as high as $300 billion.”); Robert K. Rasmussen and David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis 
of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 101 n.71 (1995); Robert D. Drain and Elizabeth J. 
Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the Federal Securities Laws?, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 569, 569-70 
(2002) (noting “formation of numerous distressed debt funds with assets in excess of $1 billion.”). 
 The seminal examination of bankruptcy claim trading can be found in Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers 
Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1990), and its 
sequels, Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Developments in Trading Claims and Taking Control of 
Corporations in Chapter 11, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1991), and Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, 
Developments in Trading Claims: Participations and Disputed Claims, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 773 (1993).   
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opportunity to invest in a debtor, influence the shape of a reorganization, and acquire control over 
the debtor or particular assets of the bankruptcy estate.   Thus, creditors who seek to escape the 
bankruptcy case with a certain payout can sell their claims against the debtor at a discount on the 
expected value of a payout at the end of the case and transfer the risk on the payout to parties 
interested in assuming the risk of an investment. The advent of widespread claims trading now 
means that membership in the community of creditors may vary throughout a bankruptcy with 
significant effects on parties’ negotiation leverage. 
The existence of a large bankruptcy claims market has spillover effects on primary capital 
markets, a phenomenon that has received scant attention. 5 Creditors’ ability to cashout at a certain 
value rather than remain involved through the course of a bankruptcy and receive an uncertain 
payout, increases their risk tolerance when originating loans, making equity investments, or 
purchasing debt from other creditors.  Creditors’ ability to assume more risk ultimately benefits 
borrowers in the form of lower borrowing costs.  The effect of the growth of the claims trading 
market on reorganizations is the subject of much debate within the bankruptcy community, 6
 
but 
there have been few legal decisions related to claims trading.  
By far the most important rulings on claims trading to date have come from the on-going 
Enron bankruptcy litigation.  Creditors have long understood that any claims they submit for 
repayment in a bankruptcy might be valid, but nevertheless subject to subordination in the order of 
payment from the bankruptcy estate’s limited funds, if the creditor behaved inequitably as the debtor 
failed.  The practice of equitable subordination is intended to punish creditors who behaved 
 
5 See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159 (1997) for a 
discussion of the dynamics of the distressed debt market. 
6 Compare Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case For Distressed Investor Presence in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191 (2005) (arguing for the positive role of distressed 
debt investors in reorganizations) with Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt? 47 B.C.L. REV.
129 (2005) (criticizing the effects of distressed debt investors on the chapter 11 process); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. 
Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First 
Century? 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153 (2004) (same); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware 
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inequitably; they should not be permitted to share pari passu with innocent creditors.   
A quartet of recent opinions by the bankruptcy court in Enron has extended the practice of 
equitable subordination far beyond its traditional limits of punishing an inequitable creditor.7 Enron 
held that innocent buyers of bankruptcy claims are now subject to subordination, not just for their 
own conduct, but also for conduct of previous owners of the claims, regardless of whether the 
conduct was connected to the claims.  
Enron created a new level of counterparty risk—the risk entailed by dealing with a particular 
transaction partner—that is hard for claims purchasers to protect against through diligence, pricing, 
warranties, or insurance.  Enron makes buyers worry not just about sellers’ title, but also about 
sellers’ interactions with the debtor unrelated to the claim.  This increased counterparty risk raises 
transaction costs, which will reduce the liquidity of the bankruptcy claims market.  Because of the 
unique position of the bankruptcy claims market as the residual capital market, a reduction in its 
liquidity will reduce liquidity in other capital markets, making it more expensive for distressed 
companies to raise capital and increasing the risk that those companies will default because they 
have borrowed at more onerous rates.  
Enron shows that commercial law has not kept pace with commercial developments like 
claims trading and that essential commercial law concepts, like negotiability, need to be expanded 
and revised to account for new types of markets.  The problems in Enron speak to a fundamental 
commercial law question about choice of property transfer rules.  Enron was based on the 
commercial law principle of nemo dat quod non habet—you can transfer only what you have.8
Nemo dat means that defenses travel with property transfers, so if bankruptcy claims would be 
 
Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987 (2002) (same), and with Tung, supra note 4 (considering the benefits and problems of 
claims trading). 
7 Enron Corp. v. Avenue Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron Corp.), 333 B.R. 205, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); 
Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., LLC (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01025 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005); Enron 
Corp. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01074 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005); Enron Corp. v. 
Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01105 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005). 
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subject to equitable subordination in the hands of a transferor, they should remain so in the hands of 
a transferee.  
Nemo dat is the default rule for property transfers, but there is a competing commercial law 
paradigm:  negotiability.  Negotiability is usually thought of in terms of Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 3, but it appears in other areas of law, including UCC Article 2 (sales),9 UCC Article 7 
(warehouse receipts and bills of lading),10
 
UCC Article 8 (investment securities),11
 
and the law of 
real estate mortgages and titles.12
 
The essential characteristic of negotiability is that only limited 
defenses travel with property, so a transferee can receive more than the transferor had—a property 
right free of certain defenses against its enforcement.  This means that there is some level of 
negotiability in any area of law with a good faith purchaser defense.  
The great advantage of a negotiability regime is that it increases the liquidity of the debts it 
covers, by lowering risks for debt buyers.  This comes at the expense of greater risk for debts’ 
obligors, whose ability to defend against a debt depends on the identity of the party attempting to 
enforce the claim.  A negotiability regime, therefore, creates an opportunity for mischief, as a bad 
actor can “wash” a debt that it could not enforce by selling it at full market value to a third party 
against whom the obligor’s defenses would be cut off.  
Historically, the law has differentiated between whether it adopts a nemo dat regime or a 
negotiability regime based on whether transactions are commercial or consumer.13 Thus, intangible 
legal claims for money—intangible choses in action—have been treated differently by law than 
either tangible instruments or goods.  This is because tangible instruments (and to a lesser extent 
goods) were assumed to be commercial, while intangible choses in action were not; they were 
 
8 Literally, no one can give that which he does not have. 
9 UCC § 2-403(1) (1951); see also United States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 1991). 
10 UCC § 7-502 (revised) (2005). 
11 UCC § 8-303 (1995). 
12 See Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1108 (1954). 
13 Id. at 1068..
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assumed to be consumer debt.14
 
Accordingly, the good faith purchaser doctrine—a type of negotiability—historically 
protected commercial purchasers, so that “commercial transactions [could] be engaged in without 
elaborate investigation of property rights and in reliance on the possession of property by one who 
offers it for sale or to secure a loan.”15
 
In contrast, the law protected consumer debtors from fraud 
by allowing them to recover from the malfeasor.16 Thus, UCC Article 2 provides for good faith 
purchaser protections for the sale of goods, a negotiability standard,17
 
but limits this to commercial 
contexts.18
 
The law adopts negotiability as the rule for property transfers only when there is clear notice 
given of the departure from nemo dat, typically in the form of the property itself or through a notice-
filing system.  Thus, UCC Article 3 requires that a debt be reified into an instrument that complies 
with various formalities in order to be negotiable,19
 
while good faith purchaser defenses are available 
for secured lenders and real estate purchasers because of the existence of notice-filing systems.20 
Bankruptcy claims present a problem for the property type shibboleth.  A bankruptcy claim is 
an intangible chose in action.  The Bankruptcy Code mandates the monetization of all non-monetary 
claims on the bankruptcy estate.21 Intangible choses in action have traditionally been assumed to be 
non-commercial.22 The problem is that bankruptcy claims are not like traditional intangible choses 
in action.  Instead, they have become sophisticated commercial investment vehicles, a development 
 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1057. 
16 Id. at 1060. 
17 UCC § 2-403(1) (1951). 
18 UCC § 2-102 (1951). 
19 UCC § 3-104 (1991).  As codified in UCC § 3-104, the basic requirements of negotiability are a writing, containing an 
unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in currency on demand or at a definite time, made out to order or bearer, 
signed by the maker or drawer, and not containing promises other than inclusion of collateral, confession of judgment, or 
certain waivers of law. 
20 UCC § 9-322 (2001). 
21 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(2) (2006). 
22 Gilmore, supra note 12, at 1068. 
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that continues to cause unease within the bankruptcy community.23 The Enron decisions show that 
the law of property transfers has not kept pace with commercial developments.  It makes little sense 
for property transfer paradigms developed in 18th century England to govern sophisticated 21st 
century American commerce, and doing so has deleterious effects on the national economy.  
This article argues that bankruptcy claims should be treated like other commercial 
transactions because the social value of increased liquidity in the claims market outweighs the harm 
of limited defenses.  In particular, this article proposes a federal law of negotiability for bankruptcy 
claims that would extend a presumption of good faith to most claims purchases without imposing the 
high transaction costs of formalities or notice-filing.  Such a rule would recognize the singular 
importance of liquidity in the bankruptcy claims’ market as the residual capital market.  Increased 
liquidity in the claims market lowers the cost of borrowing outside of bankruptcy, a benefit to all 
debtors, and cheaper borrowing decreases borrowers’ bankruptcy risk, which is a benefit that accrues 
to all creditors.  
The article begins by explaining the Enron decisions.  It then considers the doctrinal 
problems of applying nemo dat to a situation involving the priority, rather than the validity of a debt.  
Next, it examines how Enron’s application of nemo dat to a priority situation has impacted the 
bankruptcy claims market.  In light of the doctrinal and market problems with Enron, the article 
argues in favor of applying a negotiability regime to bankruptcy claims trading and proposes a 
general reconsideration of the rules governing what defenses travel with a property transfer in 
commercial contexts.  
II. THE ENRON EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION DECISIONS
In the spring of 2001, Enron was flying high.  Creditors were willing to extend it multi-
billion dollar credit facilities.  In May 2001, Enron entered into two loans, a $1.75 billion Long-Term 
 
23 See supra note 6. 
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Credit Agreement and a $1.25 billion Short-Term Credit Agreement.24 These loans were syndicated 
among a number of banks, including Fleet Bank, Citibank, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche 
Bank, and Barclays Bank (“the Seller Banks”).25 
By the end of 2001, Enron’s fortunes had plummeted amidst the exposure of a massive 
accounting fraud, and Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001.26 Between August 2002, and 
September 16, 2003, eleven distressed debt funds (“the Funds”) had purchased $268.75 million par 
value of Enron bankruptcy claims that originated in the Seller Banks’ participation in the May 2001 
credit agreements.27 
On September 23, 2003, Enron commenced an adversary proceeding, known as the 
“Megacomplaint,” against ten of the banks participating in the loans, including the Seller Banks.28 
The Megacomplaint named the Seller Banks as defendants in voidable preference and fraudulent 
conveyance claims arising from pre-paid forward transactions.29 The Megacomplaint also alleged 
that the Seller Banks aided and abetted Enron’s accounting fraud to their advantage and that Enron’s 
fraudulent financials induced other creditors to make unsecured loans to Enron they would not have 
otherwise made.30 The Megacomplaint did not allege any wrongdoing in respect to the Credit 
Agreements, however.31 
In January 2005, Enron commenced four additional adversary proceedings, this time against 
the Funds that had purchased the Seller Banks’ loan participation claims.32 Enron requested that the 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 211-12.  Fleet has since been acquired by Bank of America. 
26 Id. at 211.  
27 Id. at 212.  
28 Id.   
29 Id.  A fraudulent conveyance is a transfer of the debtor’s property for inadequate consideration when the debtor is 
insolvent or the transfer will render him so or made with the intent to hinder other creditors.  11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006).  A 
voidable preference is a transfer made by an insolvent debtor to a creditor during the statutory lookback period that is not 
in exchange for contemporaneously extended new value and results in the creditor receiving more than he would in a 
bankruptcy distribution.  11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006). 
30 Id. at 212-13. 
31 Id. at 213.  
32 Id. 
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Bankruptcy Court equitably subordinate the Funds’ claims under 11 U.S.C. § 510(c).33   Section 
510(c) provides: 
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing, the 
court may— 
 
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of 
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed 
claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed 
interest; or 
 
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the 
estate.34 
Enron’s complaint did not allege that the Funds had any knowledge of the Seller Banks’ 
alleged wrongdoing when they purchased the claims.  The Funds filed a motion to dismiss under 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b), arguing that, as a matter of law, the Fleet 
claims could not be subordinated in their hands.    
On November 17, 2005, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Arthur Gonzalez denied the motion to 
dismiss the equitable subordination action in the lead case, Enron Corp. v. Avenue Special Situations 
Fund II, LP (“Enron”).35 Enron involved five Funds that held $47.25 million par value in claims 
that originated in Fleet Bank’s $53.67 million participation in the Short-Term Credit Agreement.36 
All five of the Funds purchased their claims from banks that had in turn purchased the claims from 
 
33 Id. In the alternative, Enron requested that the court disallow the Funds’ claims under 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) 
(2006), which provides:  
 
the court shall disallow any claim of any entity from which property is recoverable under section 542, 
543, 550, or 553 of this title or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section 522(f), 522(h), 
544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, unless such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or 
turned over any such property, for which such entity or transferee is liable under section 522(i), 542, 
543, 550, or 553 of this title. 
34 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2006).  
35 The Bankruptcy Court has since denied the Funds’ motion to dismiss Enron’s § 502 action.  Enron Corp. v. Avenue 
Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron Corp.), 340 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).   
36 333 B.R. at 212.   
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Fleet. 37 One Fund also purchased a claim directly from Fleet.38 Eleven days later, in opinions 
substantially similar to the lead case, Judge Gonzalez denied the parallel motions to dismiss in the 
other three cases, which involved claims originating with Barclays, Citibank, CSFB, and Deutsche 
Bank.39 For purposes of clarity, this article will refer solely to the lead, published case, but the 
analysis applies equally to the companion cases.    
Judge Gonzalez observed that there were three issues involved in the motion to dismiss:  (1) 
whether a claim could be equitably subordinated on account of its holder’s inequitable behavior 
unconnected to the claim; (2) whether a claim that could be equitably subordinated in the hands of 
the inequitable party could be subordinated in the hands of a transferee; and (3) whether a good faith 
purchaser defense is available for a transferee of a bankruptcy claim.   
 Judge Gonzalez resolved the first issue in the affirmative.  He concluded that: 
equitable subordination is not limited to only those claims related to the inequitable 
conduct that caused the injury to the creditor class.  Rather, equitable subordination 
can apply to claims unrelated to any inequitable conduct held by the claimant alleged 
to have engaged in the conduct, limited by the amount of damages stemming from the 
inequitable conduct that is not otherwise compensated to that class.40 
Enron broke new ground on this issue, but did so on the basis of questionable authority.41 Fleet’s 
allegedly inequitable behavior was unrelated to the credit agreement participation claims.  Before 
Enron, no court had held that claims of a non-fiduciary creditor could be subordinated on account of 
the creditor’s unrelated inequitable conduct.  To be sure, several cases have stated that subordination 
need not be on account of behavior connected to the claim.  These cases, however, either involved 
 
37 Id.  Among the intermediary financial institutions was Credit Suisse First Boston, which purchased and resold $29.5 
million par value of Fleet’s participation in the credit agreements, as well as selling form its own share of the 
syndication.     
38 333 B.R. at 212.  
39 Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., LLC (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01025 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005); Enron 
Corp. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01074 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005); Enron Corp. v. 
Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), No. 05-01105 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2005).   
40 Enron, 333 B.R. at 210.   
41 Adam J. Levitin, The Limits of Enron: Counterparty Risk in Bankruptcy Claims Trading, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
389, 393-98 (2006). 
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fiduciary creditors42 or made such statements in dictum.43 Moreover, there are rulings refusing to 
subordinate creditors because the grounds for subordination were unrelated to the bankruptcy 
claim.44 Enron expanded the doctrine of equitable subordination by holding that the claim of a non-
fiduciary creditor could be subordinated on account of the creditors’ unrelated behavior. 
As for the second issue, Judge Gonzalez concluded that nemo dat applied, so “the transfer of 
a claim subject to equitable subordination does not free such claim from subordination in the hands 
of a transferee. . . .  The remedy of equitable subordination remains with the claim.”45 As 
transferees, the Funds took only as good as Fleet had held; the defenses traveled with the claim.  
Accordingly, if it turned out that Fleet had acted inequitably, the Funds could be subordinated on 
account of being transferees of Fleet’s claims.  Enron thus announced that nemo dat would apply to 
issues of priority, not just validity, in the transfer of bankruptcy claims.  This too was a major 
expansion of equitable subordination doctrine.  
 On the third issue, Judge Gonzalez concluded that the statutory good faith purchaser defense 
in 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)46 was limited to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)’s enumerated preference recovery, post-
petition transfer, and fraudulent transfer actions.47 In any event, Judge Gonzalez held that the Funds 
could not take in good faith because they were aware of the possibility of subordination by virtue of 
 
42 Wilson v. Huffman (In re Missionary Baptist Found.), 818 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1987); L & M Realty Corp. v. Leo, 249 
F.2d 668, 672 (4th Cir. 1957); In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1944); Taylor v. Standard Gas 
& Elec. Co. (The Deep Rock Case), 305 U.S. 584 (1939). 
43 Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977). 
44 In re Ahlswede, 516 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1975); Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942). 
45 Enron, 333 B.R. at 210. 
46 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)-(b) (2006) provides:   
 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a  transfer is avoided under section 544, 545,  
547, 548,  549,  553(b),  or 724(a)  of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the  
property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from— 
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose  benefit such transfer was made; or 
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee. 
(b) The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section from— 
(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing  of a present or antecedent debt, 
in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided; or 
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee. 
47 Enron, 333 B.R. at 233. 
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buying bankruptcy claims.48 By declaring it impossible to purchase a bankruptcy claim in good 
faith, Enron confirmed that nemo dat is the principle governing every aspect of all bankruptcy claims 
transactions because a nemo dat regime cannot recognize a good faith purchaser defense.    
Enron is flawed from both doctrinal and policy perspectives and is cause to reexamine the 
legal rules governing property transfers.  The following section of this article probes the doctrinal 
problems with Enron. The article then takes up Enron’s market problems, after which it turns to the 
question of what legal rules should govern property transfers.   
III. FINDING NEMO: THE DOCTRINAL LIMITS OF NEMO DAT
A. NEMO DAT: THE BASELINE RULE OF PROPERTY TRANSFERS 
Nemo dat is the baseline rule of property transfers.  Nemo dat means that a debtor has the 
same defenses against its original creditor as it does against the creditor’s transferee.  The transferee 
takes only as good as the original creditor had.   
 The alternative rule to nemo dat is negotiability.  Negotiation of a property right (typically a 
debt) cuts off some of the debtor’s defenses.  The debtor does not have as many defenses against a 
transferee as it does against its original creditor in a negotiability system.  Therefore, the 
enforceability of a debt depends on whether the original creditor or a transferee is enforcing it.   
 Another way to look at nemo dat and negotiability is in terms of what is being sold on the  
originating market and on the resale market.  In a nemo dat regime, the product sold in the resale 
market is the same sold in the originating market plus the added risks of the originating buyer’s 
malfeasance in the transaction.  In a negotiability regime, the same product is being sold in the resale 
market and the originating market.    
 The implications of these competing paradigms are well-known.  A debtor is likely to 
demand a discount of issuing a negotiable instrument because it is surrendering rights.  Negotiability 
 
48 Id. at 235. 
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does not cut off any defenses the debtor has against the original creditor, but the original creditor still 
benefits because a negotiable debt is easier to resell.  Debt purchasers are willing to pay more for a 
negotiable debt because they do not have to worry about whether there are defenses to the debt 
beyond those involving the legitimacy of the instrument into which the debt is reified.  Accordingly, 
negotiable systems have greater resale liquidity than nemo dat systems.   
 Expressed graphically, assuming that supply and demand in the debt resale market are price 
sensitive, the demand curve in a debt resale market shifts to the right in a negotiable system, 
resulting in an increased quantity of transactions and at a higher price.  The increased number of 
transactions from a rightward shift of the demand curve shows the increased liquidity in the resale 
market (QNegotiability – QNemo dat):   
Graph 1:  Increase in Resale Market Transactions Between Nemo Dat and Negotiability 
DNemo dat 
QQNemo dat QNegotiability 
DNegotiability 
SP
Debtors are not unprotected in negotiable systems.  They are able to protect themselves ex-
ante via pricing, as debtors should demand a discount from creditors for issuing them negotiable 
debt.  Debtors are also able to protect themselves ex-post via litigation.  If the original creditor 
fraudulently induced the debtor into issuing a debt, the debtor could raise fraudulent inducement 
only as a defense against the original creditor, not that creditor’s transferee.  But after the transferee 
collected on the fraudulently induced debt, the debtor could sue the original creditor for its loss.  
This places an affirmative litigation burden on the debtor, and makes the debtor assume its original 
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creditor’s credit risk in the even that a transferee enforces a claim that would be barred but for 
negotiability.  Whether this matters depends on the particulars of the parties, especially the debtor’s 
ability to bear litigation burdens and the original creditor’s solvency.     
While negotiability increases the liquidity of the resale market, its net effect of negotiability 
on liquidity in the debt origination market is indeterminate in the abstract.  In a negotiable system, 
sellers (borrowers) will demand a higher price (an interest rate discount) for their product (debt).  
Assuming that supply and demand in the lending market are price sensitive, this means that the 
supply curve in originating markets shifts leftward in a negotiable system, which will mean that there 
are fewer transactions and at a higher price.  The reduced number of transactions represents a 
decrease in the liquidity of the originating market, as indicated by the shaded area (QNemo dat - 
QNegotiability): 
Graph 2:  Decrease in the Number of Transactions in the Debt Origination Market from shift 
from Nemo Dat to Negotiability, When Only Sellers Are Considered 
SNemo dat
S Negotiability
QQNemo datQNegotiability
D
P
The decrease in liquidity in the originating market caused by borrowers demanding a 
discount is not the whole story.  Whereas the net price for a borrower is the price of the loan, the net 
price for a lender is the price of making the loan minus the resale price.  This means that borrower’s 
leftward shift of the supply curve will be offset to some degree by a rightward shift of the demand 
curve (from D1 to D2) due to lenders’ ability to offset higher costs of lending due to negotiability 
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with increased resale prices.  
 The net effect of the leftward shift of the supply curve and the rightward shift of the demand 
curve in the originating market cannot be determined in the abstract.  It could result in either greater 
or lesser liquidity in the originating market, but most likely at a higher price point (lower cost of 
borrowing) in either case.   
 Thus, it is possible for there to be a net loss in liquidity, represented by the striped area, if 
QNemo dat > QD2:
Graph 3:  First Possible Effect on Debt Originating Market from Shift Between Nemo Dat to 
Negotiability 
QNemo dat QD1
SNemo dat 
S Negotiability 
Q
D1
QD2
D2
P
Alternatively, it is possible for there to be a net gain in liquidity, represented by the striped area, if 
QD2 > QNemo dat:
Graph 4: Second Possible Effect on Debt Originating Market from Shift Between Nemo Dat to 
Negotiability 
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This story is also likely to be complicated by idiosyncratic valuation as between debtors and 
creditors.  Debtors are likely to place a higher value relative to creditors on price changes and a 
lower value on retention of defenses.  Debtors enjoy a price discount immediately.  The retention of 
defenses will be enjoyed in the future, if at all.  Moreover, if the retained defense can only be used in 
bankruptcy, debtors’ relative valuation will tilt even more strongly in favor of a presently enjoyable 
discount.  Borrowers tend to have an optimism bias; they do not think it likely that their ventures will 
end up in bankruptcy.  Debtors also know that management and ownership are likely to change in 
bankruptcy.  Therefore neither present management nor present ownership will place much value on 
the retention of a bankruptcy-only defense.   
 In contrast, creditors place higher value on bankruptcy rights because when calculating the 
credit risk on a loan, they need to account for the minimum possible recovery, which will be the 
result of their position in bankruptcy.  While creditors enjoy a higher lending price immediately 
under a nemo dat regime compared to a negotiability regime, it comes at the expense of increased 
default risk for the loans.  Negotiability, on the other hand, does not cut off any defenses as against 
an originating creditor, but it does increase the resale value of the debt, which can be enjoyed almost 
immediately.  The increased liquidity from negotiability allows creditors the comfort of easier resale.  
The usual policy choice, then, about whether to adopt a negotiability regime involves 
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weighing the social benefit of increased liquidity in the resale market with effects on liquidity in the 
originating market.  The weighing of the market impacts will also depend on the identity of the 
market players are and debtors’ ability to price for negotiability and litigate against originating 
creditors in a negotiability regime.  
To illustrate, imagine that in a negotiability system, a consumer buys a refrigerator on an 
installment contract from a dealer, and the dealer immediately resells its rights under the installment 
contract to a finance company.49 If the refrigerator does not work and the consumer does not pay, 
the consumer will have a breach of warranty defense against any attempt by the dealer to collect on 
the installment contract.  The consumer would not have that defense against the finance company’s 
collection action.   
Of course, the consumer could have demanded a sufficient discount at point of sale, but 
consumers are not skilled at pricing for negotiability, lack the requisite information to do so, and 
may not even know that they should.  Alternatively, the consumer could sue the dealer, but the 
consumer is ill-suited to bear the litigation burden.  Even if the consumer has the resources to bring 
suit, there is no guarantee that the dealer is solvent or isn’t fly-by-night.  Concern for consumers in 
this sort of situation has led to the Federal Trade Commission’s Holder in Due Course Rule, which 
allows consumers in credit contracts for the sale or lease of goods or services to assert all the 
defenses and claim that they could against the seller against a holder in due course of their debt.50 
When the debtor is not in a good position to protect himself, as in consumer cases, negotiability is a 
poor policy choice.  But where debtors are able to protect themselves, negotiability bestows the 
benefits of resale liquidity on markets. 
The evaluation of the policy choice between nemo dat and negotiability changes is 
 
49 This scenario is derived from Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability—Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 379-380 
(1971). 
50 16 C.F. R. § 433.2 (2006).  
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complicated in bankruptcy because the debtor is no longer the real party in interest, as much as 
competing creditors are.  In bankruptcy, not just a debt’s validity, but also its priority are at issue.   
B. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CLAIM PRIORITY AND CLAIM VALIDITY 
Traditionally, nemo dat has only been applied to questions of a debt’s validity.  The 
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts expresses the nemo dat principle as: 
(1) By an assignment the assignee acquires a right against the obligor only to the 
extent that the obligor is under a duty to the assignor; if the right of the assignor 
would be voidable by the obligor or unenforceable against him if no assignment had 
been made, the right of the assignee is subject to the infirmity. 
 
(2) The right of an assignee is subject to any defense or claim of the obligor which 
accrues before the obligor receives notification of the assignment, but not to defenses 
or claims which accrue thereafter except as stated in this Section or as provided by 
statute.51 
An assignee takes cum onere and is subject to all the defenses that an debtor could raise against the 
assignor that have accrued at the time the debtor received notice of the assignment. 
Similarly, UCC Article 9, which governs secured transactions adopts nemo dat, in regard to 
the enforceability of a security interest against the debtor.  UCC § 9-318(1) provides that: 
 . . . the rights of an assignee are subject to  
 
(a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and assignor and 
any defense or claim arising therefrom; and  
 
(b) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor 
which accrues before the account debtor receives notification of the 
assignment.52 
UCC § 9-318(1) mirrors the Restatement’s formulation of nemo dat. Again, nemo dat is expressed 
as applying only to the rights of an assignee in a security agreement between the debtor and a 
creditor-assignor.  It is not expressed in terms of priority among creditors.  
 
51 Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts § 336(1)-(2) (1981). Compare Restatement (First) of the Law of 
Contracts, § 167(1) (1962) (“An assignee’s right against the obligor is subject to all limitations of the obligee’s right . . . 
provided that such defenses . . . are based on facts existing at the time of the assignment, or are based on facts arising 
thereafter prior to knowledge of the assignment by the obligor.”). 
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The major innovation in Enron was to apply nemo dat to a question of equitably determined 
priority, rather than in its traditional context of a question of validity or statutorily determined 
priority.  There are different factors involved in questions of priority and validity.  Likewise, there 
are differences between priority set before a transaction and priority set afterwards.  The validity of a 
debt is a bilateral issue between a creditor and a debtor, whereas the priority is a multilateral issue 
between creditors of the same debtor.  A debt’s priority can be set ex-ante, by statute, by perfection 
of a security interest, or by a contractual subordination agreement.  It can also be set ex-post by 
equitable subordination.  Enron did not properly account for these differences, which are crucial 
determinates of choice of property transfer law.   
Nemo dat is designed to protect debtors.  Under nemo dat, the defenses available to a debtor 
do not vary, regardless of whether it is the original creditor or that creditor’s transferee that attempts 
to enforce the debt.  Concern over the protection of debtors is an issue that animates nemo dat in a 
validity context because validity of a debt is an issue between the debtor and a creditor.   
Priority, in contrast, is an issue among creditors.  When creditors’ claims can only be 
satisfied from a limited fund, the order in which their claims are satisfied is of no legal concern to the 
debtor.53 Nemo dat protects creditors in a priority context from valid claims receiving improved 
priority in the hands of transferees.  This protection is justified only to the extent that a creditor has 
relied on other creditors’ priority in its lending decisions.  Therefore, if a creditor lends with the 
assumption that it will be last in line in a bankruptcy distribution, it does not merit the protections of 
nemo dat.
Bankruptcy is a multi-party proceeding in which creditors are typically competing with each 
other for recoveries from a limited (and usually inadequate) fund, so the relative priority of their 
 
52 UCC § 9-318(1) (2001). 
53 When creditors’ claims can be satisfied from multiple, overlapping assets, the debtor has an interest in the distribution, 
and is protected by the doctrine of marshalling. 
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claims crucial.  If a creditor’s claim is elevated in priority, it will increase his recovery and decrease 
other creditors’ recoveries.  As formulated in the Restatement, nemo dat deals only with the defenses 
of an debtor against a claim in the hands of an assignee.  In this formulation, the principle has little 
bearing on Enron. In Enron, the issue was not the rights of the assignee Funds vis-à-vis the debtor, 
Enron, but vis-à-vis other creditors.   
Defenses may travel with a claim, but equitable subordination is not a defense against a 
claim; it does not affect a claim’s validity.  A subordinated claim is still valid and enforceable 
against the debtor, just as an unperfected security interest is enforceable against the debtor,54 even if 
neither affects priority vis-à-vis third parties.  Subordinated claims still vote and remain eligible for 
sharing in a distribution, and their holders still have standing to litigate issues, unlike a party with a 
disallowed claim.55 Subordinated claims, unlike disallowed claims, still have a seat at the table, even 
if they are the last to eat and nothing may be left for them.  Subordination affects rights only vis-à-
vis other creditors. 
Functionally, to be sure, priority is often a proxy for validity.  In a Chapter 11 case, the plan 
often provides that there will be no distribution to any class with lower priority than the general 
unsecured creditors, and subordinated claims are typically inferior to general unsecured claims.  Yet 
subordination and disallowance should not be conflated simply because they may have a similar 
effect.  They are different legal processes.  A valid claim may be subordinated, and a claim may be 
disallowed even though it could not have been subordinated, for example, a claim that is not timely 
filed with the court or a claim based on a disputed debt that is resolved in favor of the bankruptcy 
estate.  Whether equitable subordination and disallowance have the same effect on distribution 
depends on the assets of the estate, not on any legal principle.  If an estate turns out to be solvent, 
 
54 UCC § 9-203 (2001). 
55 See Daniel C. Cohn, Subordinated Claims:  The Classification and Voting Rights Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 308-11 (1982).  
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subordinated claims will be paid in full.  Although such cases are the exception, they are illustrative 
of the nature of equitable subordination.   
Nor is subordination necessarily complete.  Section 510(c) does not require that subordinated 
claims have inferior status to all claims.56 Thus, there could be a partial or even full recovery on a 
subordinated claim even if the debtor is not solvent at the time of distribution.  In contrast, there is 
no recovery possible on a disallowed claim.  Although equitable subordination often has the same 
effect as claim disallowance, they are different remedies that operate on different principles. 
It might be argued that issues of priority cannot be separated from issues of validity because 
they representative of the bankruptcy estate—the trustee or debtor in possession (DIP)—is a 
fiduciary of the creditors.  The dual roles of trustee or DIP as representative of the estate and 
representative of the creditors do not mean that a validity analysis should be applied to questions of 
priority.  A debt’s priority as a result of equitable subordination does not affect a trustee or DIP in its 
role as representative of the creditors because equitable subordination presents trustees or DIPs with 
a conflict of interest between different fiduciary obligations.  
Trustees and DIPs owe fiduciary duties to the estate57 and to the unsecured creditors58 
because the trustee (or DIP) acts as their representative.59 The fiduciary duties owed to the estate 
require the trustee or DIP to maximize the estate’s value by recovering preferences and fraudulent 
conveyances.60 Equitable subordination, in contrast, does not increase the size of the estate.  Instead, 
equitable subordination actions typically present the trustee or DIP with a conflict of fiduciary 
duties.   
 
56 Enron, 333 B.R. at 217-18. 
57 See 11 U.S.C. § 323 (2006). 
58 See, e.g., Coleman v. Cmty. Trust Bank (In re Coleman), 426 F.3d 719, 729 (4th Cir. 2005); In re Mushrooms Transp. 
Co., 382 F.3d 325, 339 (3d Cir. 2004); Commodore Int’l Ltd. v. Gould (In re Commodore Int’l Ltd.), 262 F.3d 96, 98 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Peterson v. Scott (In re Scott), 172 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 1999); In re Marvel Entm’t Group, Inc., 140 F.3d 
463, 474 (3d Cir. 1998).   
59 Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1987) 
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The trustee or DIP owes fiduciary duties equally to all its creditors.  But equitable 
subordination does not benefit all unsecured creditors equally.61 Equitable subordination litigation 
brought by the trustee or DIP comes at the expense of all unsecured creditors, but the benefits do not 
accrue to all unsecured creditors equally. 
The conflict of interest is underscored by the comparison of equitable subordination with 
fraudulent conveyance and voidable preference actions.  The Supreme Court has held that a trustee is 
subrogated to all individual creditors’ rights to bring fraudulent conveyance actions.62 The trustee 
must act for the benefit of all creditors equally, however.  This is not a problem in fraudulent 
conveyance actions because the recovered transfer goes to the bankruptcy estate and thus benefits all 
creditors.  There is no equivalent holding for equitable subordination because § 510(c) permits 
subordination to benefit select creditors by allowing subordination to be partial, rather than complete 
demotion.63  If the subordinated party remains less than fully subordinated, then no party of lower 
priority has benefited from the subordination.  Even when subordination is complete, it does not 
benefit all creditors, except in the unusual situation in which the subordinated party had higher 
priority than all other creditors.   
When a DIP seeks equitable subordination, it is not acting in the interests of all unsecured 
creditors or the estate as a whole.  Instead, it is forcing some creditors to shoulder the cost of a 
benefit that will accrue only to other creditors.  This is not the mere exercise of business judgment 
and is barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New 
 
60 See, e.g., Coleman, 426 F.3d at 729; Mushrooms, 382 F.3d at 339; Commodore, 262 F.3d at 98; Peterson, 172 F.3d at 
967; Marvel Entm’t, 140 F.3d at 474. 
61 In re Vitreous Steel Prods. Co., 911 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1990). 
62 Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).  
63 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2006).  The distinct treatment of fraudulent conveyances and equitable subordination has been 
criticized.  See David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable Subordination, 45 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 157 (2003) (arguing that both types of actions should be viewed in terms of effecting a transfer to 
the injured creditors).  But see Adam J. Levitin, “Rough Justice?  The Nature of Equitable Subordination and Problems 
of Constitutional Standing,” working paper, May 11, 2006, at 16 n.66, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900444.   
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York, which held that a trustee cannot prosecute claims that belong to only a subset of creditors.64 
Indeed, it is debatable whether trustees and DIPs even have Constitutional standing to bring 
equitable subordination actions.65 The interest of a trustee or DIP in ensuring a fair distribution does 
not turn questions of priority—the relationship among creditors—into one of validity—the 
relationship between a creditor and the debtor.  
Enron wrongly conflated questions of priority and validity in its consideration of whether to 
apply nemo dat. Goldie v. Cox,66 the case that Enron cited for the principle that “transferees should 
[not] enjoy greater rights than the transferor,”67 was a validity case, not a priority case.  In Goldie,
the bankrupt had a DIP account with a creditor.68 The creditor sold all of his bankruptcy claims held 
as of a certain date.69 The creditor continued to lend to the bankrupt, and the bankrupt made 
payments on his account to the assignor.70 The bankruptcy referee had held that, under a FIFO 
repayment principle, the bankrupt’s payments should be credited to the earlier accrued assigned 
account first, and that the bankrupt’s payments had paid off the assigned debt.71 Accordingly, the 
referee disallowed the assignee’s claim.72 The assignee did not appeal.73 The Eighth Circuit dealt 
with the issue in superficial dictum, noting that “there is no point in examining this matter.”74 The 
Eighth Circuit agreed with the referee’s ruling, and noted that if all the claims were still held by the 
assignor, the payments would have been first credited to the oldest debts, so the assignee should fare 
 
64 406 U.S. 416 (1972).  See also E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979 (11th Cir. 1990); Williams v. Cal. 
First Bank, 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co, 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987). 
65 Levitin, supra note 63, at 15-21.  This is not to say that DIPs do not have a strategic interest in the order of priorities.  
A creditor’s priority affects its leverage with the estate in negotiating DIP operations and negotiating a plan, and a DIP 
may want to favor certain creditors in order to curry post-bankruptcy relationships.  Id. at 14-15.  
66 135 F.2d 695, 720 (8th Cir. 1942). 
67 Enron, 330 B.R. at 223. 
68 Goldie, 135 F.2d at 720.
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.
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likewise.75 
There was no subordination issue in Goldie; the question was of claim allowance.  Goldie 
does not tell us that the Funds should have been subordinated in Enron. Claim allowance is an issue 
of validity, not priority, and falls squarely within the traditional ambit of nemo dat. Whether nemo 
dat should be extended to priority is a more complex issue.   
 
IV. SHOULD NEMO DAT APPLY TO BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS’ PRIORITY?
A. NEMO DAT IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 
1.  Why the Principles of Equity Matter 
Any attempt to answer whether nemo dat should apply to priority resulting from equitable 
subordination should begin with the text of § 510(c).  Section 510(c) provides that, after notice and a 
hearing, the court may: 
Under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution 
all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part of 
an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest . . ..76 
While “equitable” is often used in the Bankruptcy Code as a synonym for “fair” or “just,”77 it 
 
75 Id. 
76 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2006).   
77 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(5) (2006) (trustee is to perform all obligations of the debtor on an unexpired lease of personal 
property unless court decides otherwise “based on the equities of the case.”); 11 U.S.C. § 502(j) (2006) (reconsideration 
of allowed or disallowed claim is to be made “according to the equities of the case”); 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2006) 
(claims may be subordinated “under principles of equitable subordination”); 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(III) (2006) 
(asbestos channeling injunction may only be issued if pursuit of claims outside of plan would likely threaten “plan’s 
purpose to deal equitably with claims and future demands”); 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) (2006) (injunction issued in 
conjunction with chapter 11 plan only if “the court determines. . .such injunction. . .is fair and equitable”); 11 U.S.C. § 
524(h)(1)(A) (2006) (referencing the “fair and equitable” requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)); 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) 
(2006) (after acquired property clauses in security agreements are valid except to the extent that the court orders 
otherwise after notice and a hearing “based on the equities of the case.”); 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2006) (limitation on 
post-petition effect of after-acquired property clauses of security agreements to be “based on the equities of the case”); 
11 U.S.C. § 557(d)(2)(D) (2006) (disposition of grain or proceeds of grain may be by “such other method as is equitable 
in the case”); 11 U.S.C. § 723(d) (2006) (determination of distribution of surplus recovered by a partnership trustee 
against general partners shall be equitable); 11 U.S.C. § 1112(d)(3) (2006) (conversion of case from chapter 11 to 
chapter 12 must be equitable); 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (2006) (debtor rejecting a collective bargaining agreement 
shall make a proposal for modifications in employee benefits and protections that assures that “all creditors, the debtor, 
and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably”); 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (2006) (collective bargaining 
agreements to be rejected only if “the court finds. . .the balance of the equities favors rejection”); 11 U.S.C. § 
1114(f)(1)(A) (2006) (debtor modifying retiree benefits must assure that “all creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected 
parties are treated fairly and equitably”); 11 U.S.C. § 1114(g)(3) (2006) (modification of payment of retiree benefits if 
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has a particular meaning in § 510(c), as indicated by the phrase “principles of equitable 
subordination.”   
As the legislative history of § 510(c) makes clear, the “principles of equitable subordination” 
is a term of art referring to historic Anglo-American traditions of courts of equity, and subordination 
of claims in bankruptcy must be viewed in light of these traditions.  Although bankruptcy courts are 
often called “courts of equity,” this is an inaccurate description because bankruptcy courts lack 
classic equity powers and jurisdiction.78 
Section 510(c) is an exception, where traditional equity jurisprudence plays a role in 
bankruptcy.  The Senate Report of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which enacted § 510(c), 
noted that:  
The bill provides, however, that any subordination ordered under this provision must 
be based on principles of equitable subordination. These principles are defined by 
case law, and have generally indicated that a claim may normally be subordinated 
only if its holder is guilty of misconduct. As originally introduced, the bill provided 
specifically that a tax claim may not be subordinated on equitable grounds. The bill 
deletes this express exception, but the effect under the amendment should be much 
the same in most situations since, under the judicial doctrine of equitable 
subordination, a tax claim would rarely be subordinated.79 
Similarly, the House Report noted that § 510(c) permits the subordination of claims and 
interests on equitable grounds:   
 
“all creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably, and [a modification of the order] 
is clearly favored by the balance of the equities”); 11 U.S.C. § 1114(l) (2006) (court may reinstate retiree benefits that 
have been modified unless the equities favor modification); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006) (cramdown plan must be “fair 
and equitable” to be confirmed); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2006) (defining what “fair and equitable” includes for the 
purposes of § 1129(b)(1)); 11 U.S.C. § 1170(e)(1) (2006) (approval of abandonment of railroad line requires “a fair 
arrangement at least as protective of the interests of employees as that established under section 11326(a) of title 49”); 11 
U.S.C. § 1172(c)(1) (2006) (approval of railroad reorganization plan requires “a fair arrangement at least as protective of 
the interests of employees as that established under section 11326(a) of title 49”).  See also 11 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(1) 
(2006) and  11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1) (2006) (“circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable” 
for failure to make payments under a plan); 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3)(B) (2006) and 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)(A)(i) (2006) (no 
“undue hardship”); 11 U.S.C. § 557(f)(1) (2006) (“in the interests of justice”).  Many historically equitable doctrines, 
such as good faith, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2006), fraud, see 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006), and laches, see 11 U.S.C. § 524 
(2006), are incorporated throughout the Code, but without allowing judicial discretion.  
78 Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy:  Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 24 (2006).  See also Marcia Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”:  What Does that 
Mean? 50 S.C. L. REV. 275 (1999). 
79 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 74 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5860. 
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this section is intended to codify case law . . . and is not intended to limit the court’s 
power in any way.  The bankruptcy court will remain a court of equity . . . .  The 
court’s power is broader than the general doctrine of equitable subordination, and 
encompasses subordination on any equitable grounds.80 
While the House Report stated that § 510(c) power is broader than the general doctrine, it did 
not spell out how it is broader, as pre-existing equitable subordination doctrine appears to have 
allowed subordination for any sort of inequitable behavior; there are not exceptions evident in 
caselaw.   
Finally, the legislative history includes statements by the legislative leaders on the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act, Representative Don Edwards (D-Cal.) and Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-
Ariz.).  They observed that § 510(c) 
is intended that the term “principles of equitable subordination” follow existing case 
law and leave to the courts development of this principle. To date, under existing law, 
a claim is generally subordinated only if holder of such claim is guilty of inequitable 
conduct, or the claim itself is of a status susceptible to subordination, such as a 
penalty or a claim for damages arising from the purchase or sale of a security of the 
debtor. The fact that such a claim may be secured is of no consequence to the issue of 
subordination. However, it is inconceivable that the status of a claim as a secured 
claim could ever be grounds for justifying equitable subordination.81 
Several points are apparent from the legislative history.  First, Congress intended for 
equitable subordination to occur under equitable principles.  Second, Congress understood these 
principles to be those that existed in pre-Code caselaw.  Third, Congress understood that these 
principles typically require the holder, rather than the transferor, of the claim to be guilty of 
misconduct.82 The exception to this principle is when the nature of the claim itself is inequitable, but 
Congress wanted to be clear that there was nothing per se inequitable about taxes or secured 
 
80 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 359 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6315. 
81 124 Cong. Rec. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 
6452 (1978); 124 Cong. Rec. S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6521. 
82 Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control, supra note 4, at 9-13 (noting the existence of claims trading 
before 1978).  
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claims.83 While it is not clear what sort of claim would be per se inequitable, one suspects that it 
might include claims that are “contrary to public policy” or somehow categorically disfavored, like 
punitive damages or penalties.  The Supreme Court, however, has since held that types of claims 
may not be categorically subordinated,84 because doing so would infringe on Congress’ priority 
scheme.85 In any case, neither the basic principle nor the exception existed in Enron.
The statements of the legislative leaders add a twist.86 They noted courts were to develop the 
law of equitable subordination.  That is, equitable subordination need not remain frozen in its 1978 
state;87 federal common lawmaking is explicitly authorized.88 But there are clearly limits placed by 
the text of § 510(c), particularly that the development must be within the principles of equitable 
subordination.  The legislative history does not contemplate a free license to subordinate claims and 
interests whenever it suits a judge.  The subordination must bear some relation to what is equitable.  
Examples of how the law could develop beyond its state in 1978 within the realm of equity 
might be the subordination of claims for parties that did not commit the inequitable conduct, but 
were aware of it, had a duty to report or prevent it, and failed to do so.  This might include an 
attorney who failed to go up the ladder to report a fraud.  Another possibility of development within 
the bounds of equity would be the subordination of a claim by a party who would be liable to the 
debtor under a gross negligence standard, but only committed simple negligence.  Thus, it might be 
 
83 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2006).  
84 Noland v. United States, 517 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1996). 
85 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006). 
86 We should be cautious about making too much out of the legislative history of § 510(c), particularly the statements of 
individual legislative leaders.  In Noland, 517 U.S. at 540, the Supreme Court considered the legislative history of § 
510(c), but disregarded the statement that equitable subordination allows for the subordination of claims of particular 
statuses, such as penalties; instead, the Supreme Court reversed the subordination of a tax penalty claim. 
87 Query what impact, if any, there is on § 510(c) from the Supreme Court’s ruling in a non-bankruptcy situation that the 
inherent equity powers of a district court are those that were exercised by the English chancery courts in 1789.  Grupo 
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999).  For a consideration of the applicability 
of Grupo Mexicano to bankruptcy, see Levitin, supra note 78, at 50-57.   If Grupo Mexicano is not applicable to 
bankruptcy, it might still apply to § 510(c) actions because of the “principles of equitable subordination” language, 
although the implication from the legislative history was that this was to reflect the principles as they had developed up 
until 1978 and that further development was within contemplation of the drafters. 
88 See Levitin, supra note 78, at 66-78, regarding federal common lawmaking authority in bankruptcy.  
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proper to subordinate the indemnification claim of a negligent officer or director against a 
corporation whose charter provides for officer and director indemnification except in cases of gross 
negligence or willful misconduct.  The corporation would still indemnify the officer or director, but 
the priority of the claim would be lower. 
The limitation of equitable principles on the development of equitable subordination is 
confirmed by the identical statements of Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini that, “Since 
the House amendment authorizes subordination of claims only under principles of equitable 
subordination, and thus incorporates principles of existing case law, a tax claim would rarely be 
subordinated under this provision of the bill.”89 Claims may only be subordinated equitably, and 
there is nothing inherently inequitable about a tax claim or a secured claim.90 The inequity will 
usually be by the holder of the claim.  At least as envisioned by the legislative leader, it would be 
only the rare type of claim that would be categorically inequitable, and the Supreme Court has since 
said that subordination may not occur solely because of the categorical nature of a claim, such as a 
tax penalty claim.91 Thus, equity provides the limits of subordination.  While the law of 
subordination may develop, this development must exist within the confines of the “principles of 
equitable subordination.” 
The text and legislative history of § 510(c) tell us that subordination must be done under the 
principles of equitable subordination.  These principles can develop, but they are bounded by the fact 
that subordination must be equitable.  In § 510(c), equitable means not only fair, but fair within the 
sense of what a court of equity would do.   
2.  Nemo Dat Did Not Apply in Equity Historically  
There are two sources for the principles of equity:  case law and equity maxims.  Both 
counsel against the application of nemo dat to priority resulting from equitable subordination.  For 
 
89 124 Cong. Rec. H11095, H11113 (Sept. 28, 1978).  
90 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 74 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5860. 
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there to be a question of priority, there have to be multiple parties competing for control over a 
limited fund.  Such suits were never resolved in law courts, but in chancery.92 The core areas of 
equity jurisdiction are all areas involving division of a limited asset:  bankruptcy estates, estates of 
deceased persons, trusts, land rights.93 Nemo dat is a common law doctrine; historically it did not 
apply in equity.94 This means that nemo dat has never historically been applied to issues of priority.  
3.  Equity Acts In Personam
Equity maxims—glowing phrases that summarize the principles of chancery decisions—are 
another source for the principles of equity.95 Equity maxims have been more or less canonized, 
albeit with some slight variation.  While we should not make too much out of these old and opaque 
phrases,96 these maxims are important not only because § 510(c) itself tells us to look to the 
“principles of equitable subordination,” but because they encapsulate centuries of judicial wisdom.  
Although their interpretation is an open matter, they are important guideposts for our present 
jurisprudence and adherence to them ensures that equitable subordination remains equitable, and 
does not become a bunion on the Chancellor’s foot, a problem noted by the 17th century 
commentator John Selden:   
Equity is A Roguish thing, for Law wee have a measure known what to trust too.  
Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or 
narrower, soe is equity.  Tis all one as if they should make the Standard for the 
measure wee call A foot, to be the Chancellors Foot; what an uncertain measure 
would this be; One Chancellor ha’s a long foot another A short foot a third an 
indifferent foot; this the same thing in the Chancellors Conscience.97 
91 Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 229. 
92 See Harman v. Masoneilan Int’l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 498 (Del. 1982)  (citing 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 1300 at 647 (14th Ed. 1918)); Bovay v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808,813 (Del. 1944) (“The 
execution of a trust and the following and administering  of trust funds are immemorial heads of equity jurisprudence.”); 
Hayden v. Thompson, 71 F. 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1895). 
93 See P.V. BAKER & P. ST. J. LANGAN, SNELL'S EQUITY 1 (29th ed. 1990).  
94 Holt v. The Am. Woolen Co., 150 A. 382, 383  (Me. 1930); Emerson v. European & N. Am. R. Co., 67 Me. 387 (Me. 
1877); Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 F. Cas. 527, 531 (C.C.D. Me. 1843)  (No. 9,673) (Story J.). 
95 Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 273-75 
(1991).   
96 See Jeremiah Smith, The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1896). 
97 See JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 43 (Pollock ed., 1927) (spelling, capitalization, and punctuation original). 
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Without the benefit of maxims and precedent, it is hard to know what principle would guide equity, 
and therefore equitable subordination, if not a judge’s own personal priority scheme.    
One commentator has noted that “it would not be difficult to reduce [all of the equity maxims 
to two:] ‘Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy’, and ‘Equity acts on the person.’”98 
These two maxims, particularly the later one, often given as “equity acts in personam,”99 highlight a 
fundamental problem with Enron, because Enron decided the first issue—whether Fleet could be 
subordinated for actions unrelated to the claim—on an in personam basis, but decided the second 
issue—whether the Funds could be subordinated for holding a claim that could have been 
subordinated in Fleet’s hands—using an in rem logic.   
 Generally, the in personam maxim has been understood to address jurisdictional questions.100 
The maxim itself bears no indication that it is so restricted, and, historically, equity has exercised in 
rem jurisdiction.101 All of trust law, where the trust is the res, bears testament to this, and 
bankruptcy is itself essentially an in rem proceeding102 dealing with the res of the bankruptcy estate, 
itself a trust.  A reconsideration of the in personam maxim is necessary, therefore.   
A sensible approach is to take the maxim literally and not imply a jurisdictional aspect.  In 
Ernst v. The White Motor Credit Corp.,103 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
did just this.  The court refused to grant equitable perfection to a security interest misfiled in good 
faith in the wrong county (and thus unperfected) because perfection would affect third parties, 
 
98 BAKER & LANGAN, supra note 93, at 27. 
99Id.; EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH R. RE, REMEDIES 30 (5th Ed. 2000); PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE:
EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1990), 11-12 (quoting RICHARD FRANCIS, MAXIMS OF EQUITY (1726)). 
100 See Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151, 154 (1884).  Moreover, some courts and commentators have argued that the 
maxim is not even correct as a positive statement of English equity jurisprudence regarding jurisdiction.  Union Sulphur 
Co. v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 32 F.2d 517, 518 (S.D. Tex., 1929); William F. Walsh, Development in Equity of the 
Power to Act In Rem, 6 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1928).   
101 Id. at 3.   
102 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S.Ct. 990, 996-97 (2006); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U. S. 440, 
448 (2004). 
103 Ernst v. The White Motor Credit Corp., (In re Villars), 28 B.R. 289 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). 
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin 
 
30
including the trustee in bankruptcy, who was the debtor’s successor in interest.104 The court noted 
that, “It would be absolutely incongruous to apply equitable principles to defeat the rights of third 
parties who were in no way involved in the questioned transaction.  Equity acts in personam, not in 
rem.”105 
The in personam maxim can reasonably be understood to mean that equity looks at the 
person, not at the claim.  Such an interpretation is consistent with other equity maxims.  Perhaps the 
best-known equity maxim is that “One who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”106 This 
maxim means equitable relief will not be granted to parties who have engaged in misconduct.107 The 
clean hands maxim reminds us that equity looks at the entire picture, not just the specific claim.  The 
inequitable behavior that creates unclean hands need not be the act before the court.  Equity acts in 
personam by looking at the entirety of the personae before the court.108 
This tells us that the first issue in Enron—whether the loan participation claims could be 
subordinated in Fleet’s hands for Fleet’s unrelated wrongdoing—was consistent with the principles 
of equity, even if it was based on questionable authority.109 If Fleet engaged in inequitable behavior 
toward Enron, then any claims in Fleet’s hands should be subject to equitable subordination, 
regardless of whether Fleet was the original holder of the claims or a transferee.110 
There is also a negative implication to the clean hands maxim:  equity will not punish those 
 
104 UCC § 9-203(2) (2001).  Under Article 9, perfection or lack thereof relates only to the priority of a claim over other 
secured creditors’ interests in the collateral, not to the creditor’s rights vis-à-vis the debtor.   
105 Ernst, 28 B.R. 289.  Several courts have adopted similar stances in cases dealing with equitable subrogation.  
Subrogation is a legal fiction of an assignment or transfer that allows one party to stand in the shoes of another party in 
reference to a claim.  Subrogation is intended to provide meritorious creditors who have paid the debt of another relief 
against loss.  Rinn v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Md., 176 B.R. 401, 407 (D.Md. 1995).  It is a doctrine that originates in 
equity and is governed by equitable principles.  Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion v. A.J. Perez Export 
Co., 303 F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir. 1962).  
106 BAKER & LANGAN, supra note 93, at 27. 
107 Jones v. Bodley, 39 A.2d 413, 416 (Del. Ch. 1944).  
108 Comstock, 335 U.S. at 238 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Equity looks in all directions.”).   
109 Levitin, supra note 41, at 393. 
110 Nonetheless, it should be noted that the first half of Enron stands on shaky precedent.  Judge Gonzalez repeatedly 
emphasized that there was no precedent barring him from subordinating Fleet, 333 B.R. at 219, 219 n.4, 220, 222, but 
this hardly means that the contrapositive is true and that subordination would be proper.   
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who have clean hands.  This implication can be tied to a third equity maxim, “Equity is equality.”111 
Bankruptcy incorporates this maxim in its distribution scheme by treating all claims within a class 
alike in regard to distribution.112 Subordination is an exception to equal treatment of claims that 
should otherwise be in the same class.  In this sense, a party that seeks to avoid subordination must 
have clean hands if it wants the equitable treatment of equality with like claims.   
Similarly, the maxim that “he who seeks equity must do equity,”113 emphasizes that equity 
may not be used for inequitable ends.  Just as equity will not aid the wicked, it will not punish the 
innocent.114 Nemo dat sometimes results in punishing the innocent.  If a creditor obtained a debt by 
fraud and then sold the debt to a good faith purchaser, denying the purchaser the ability to enforce 
the debt penalizes the purchaser, even if he can still hope to recover from his seller.  A fortiori, then 
that applying nemo dat to issues of priority in an equitable subordination context, where the 
subordination was on account of behavior unrelated to the claim, involves punishing innocent claims 
purchasers.  The Enron equitable subordination was contrary to the principles of equity.  Nemo dat 
should not apply to situations in which priority is set equitably after creditors have extended value.   
4.  The Principles of Equity Imply a Good Faith Purchaser Defense 
The principles of equity not only argue against applying nemo dat to the transferability of 
equitable priority determined after the transfer; they also argue for allowing the good faith purchaser 
defense.  A good faith purchaser defense is an exception to nemo dat because the good faith 
purchaser is protected from defenses that could be raised against the original creditor.  The Funds 
 
111 BAKER & LANGAN, supra note 93, at 27. 
112 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(4), 1222(a)(3), 1322(a)(3) (2006).  
113 BAKER & LANGAN, supra note 93, at 27. 
114 Equity’s reluctance to be used as an instrument to harm the innocent derives from its historical origins as a quasi-
ecclesiastical court that made its appeal to the conscience of the parties and was known as “the king’s conscience.”114 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, Ch. 4, *46 (1758).  See Marcia Krieger, “The 
Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”:  What Does that Mean? 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 279 (1999). As it developed, 
“[e]quity is a moral sense of fairness based on conscience.” William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of 
the Delaware Court of Chancery, 1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 821 (1993).  Notably, only personae, not res have 
consciences.  A person can be guilty; an object cannot.  Imparting a taint to an inanimate object like a bankruptcy claim 
is inconsistent with the basic nature of equity.  Similarly, our commonly shared moral and legal sense cautions that we 
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attempted to make a good faith purchaser defense on the basis of § 550(b) of the Code, which 
provides that the trustee or DIP may not avoid certain liens or recover a preference, setoff, post-
petition transaction, or fraudulent transfer against a good faith taker for value either from an 
immediate transferee or from the taker’s subsequent good faith transferees.115 
The Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument under the principle expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius because § 550(b) only creates a good faith exception to transfers that could be avoided under 
§§ 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), and 724(a), not to claims subordinatable under § 510(c).116 The 
Bankruptcy Court noted that the types of transactions protected under § 550(b) were transactions 
between a good faith purchaser and the bankruptcy estate.117 Section 550(b) protects the ownership 
rights of purchasers from the estate. Section 510(c), in contrast, deals only with priority, not 
ownership rights, and the Funds were looking for protection as good faith purchasers from a prior 
claimant on the estate, rather than from the estate itself.  The Bankruptcy Court correctly divined that 
§ 550(b)’s good faith purchaser protections are meant to encourage parties to deal with the 
bankruptcy estate; it is not meant to encourage (or one might add discourage) claims trading.  
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court held that there was no reason to imply a good faith purchaser 
defense to § 510(c) actions on the basis of § 550(b)’s provisions.118 
There are a couple of alternative explanations, not considered by the Bankruptcy Court, for 
why § 550(b) does not provide a statutory good faith purchaser defense to equitable subordination 
that do not preclude a non-statutory basis for such a defense.  First, when Congress drafted the 
Bankruptcy Code, it did not conceive of a situation in which a good faith purchaser of a bankruptcy 
claim could be subordinated under the principles of equitable subordination.  There was no need for 
an explicit statutory grant of a good faith defense, because there was no anticipated harm.  Equitable 
 
can only hold a person accountable for his own actions, absent special duties. 
115 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (2006).   
116 Enron, 333 B.R. at 233.  See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (2006). 
117 Enron, 333 B.R. at 233.   
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subordination was never conceived of as affecting parties down a chain of title, only the party that 
acted inequitably itself.  Accordingly, § 510 was not grouped in the Code with the provisions that 
affect transferred claims and obligations in subchapter III of Chapter 5.   
More importantly, a good faith defense is implied within § 510(c) by the phrase “principles 
of equitable subordination.”  Good faith is an equitable defense119 that one would expect to be 
encompassed within the principles of equitable subordination.  Congress did not want to assume the 
daunting task of codifying equity jurisprudence—it was far easier to direct the courts to do what they 
have traditionally done.  This means protecting good faith purchasers in equitable actions.  The 
absence of a statutory good faith purchaser defense against equitable subordination in § 550(b) does 
not preclude an implied equitable defense in § 510(c).120 
118 Id. 
119 See, e.g., Batiansila v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 952 F.2d 893, 894 (5th Cir. 1992). 
120 It is worth noting that a good faith purchaser defense does exist for purchasers of claims from federal deposit insurers.  
When federal deposit insurers such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) take over a failed financial institution, they are subrogated to bankruptcy claims 
held by the institution.  These federal agencies are protected as subrogors against a number of claims that could have 
been brought against the financial institutions themselves by the federal holder-in-due-course (FHDC) doctrine, derived 
from D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC120 and Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 § 2(13)(e). 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) 
(2006).  Moreover, purchasers from a FHDC receive FHDC protection. FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989); 
Porras v. Petroplex Sav. Assoc., 903 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1990).   
The FHDC doctrine has been used to protect against claims of fraud in the inducement, In re Hood, 95 Bankr. 
696, 701 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989), but has been held not to protect against preference actions because they arise under a 
federal statute. First City Fin. Corp. v. FDIC (In re First City Fin. Corp.), 61 Bankr. 95, 97 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986); La 
Mancha Aire, Inc. v. FDIC (In re La Mancha Aire, Inc.), 41 Bankr. 647 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). The Fifth Circuit has 
noted in dicta, however, that the doctrine would shield against equitable subordination, itself a federal cause of action. 
Holt v. FDIC (In re CTS Truss, Inc.), 868 F.2d 146, 150 (5th Cir 1989).  But cf. Kingsway Revocable Trust v. FSLIC (In 
re C.P.C. Dev. Co. No. 5), 113 Bankr. 637, 641-43 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (bad acts of S&L could be imputed to FSLIC 
as receiver for purposes of equitable subordination).  See Fortgang & Mayer, Developments in Trading Claims and 
Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, supra note 4, at 15, for the strange history of CTS Truss.  As originally 
published, the CTS Truss opinion had as an alternative holding, rather than as a dictum, that an innocent purchaser of a 
claim cannot be subordinated, regardless of whether it was a private party or the FDIC.  Holt v. FDIC (In re CTS Truss, 
Inc.), 859 F.2d 357, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1988), modified, 868 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1989).  In any case, though, the FDIC was 
not an ordinary innocent purchaser.  It was required to take over the failed bank in question by statute. 
There are unique policy impetuses behind the FHDC doctrine.  The government is subrogated not by choice by 
statutory duties.  If the government finds itself holding a worthless claim, it is ultimately the taxpayers who bear the cost.  
Moreover, it would be inequitable to attribute the wrongdoing of a failed financial institution to the government agency 
that is required to step into its shoes as part of its insolvency proceedings.  Accordingly, the government gets special 
treatment elsewhere as a creditor in bankruptcy, be it priority status of certain claims or the exemption to the automatic 
stay for regulatory actions.  There are different policy issues that come into play in the federal holder-in-due-course 
doctrine, but its existence shows that the sky will not fall if a purchaser in good faith defense is found in § 510(c). 
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B. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ADOPTS NEMO DAT FOR PRIORITY IN A LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCE 
In considering whether nemo dat applies to bankruptcy claims’ priority, a factor that must be 
considered is the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of priority of subrogated claims.  Unfortunately, it is 
hard to draw generalizations from this limited context.  Section 507(a) of the Code elevates the 
priority of nine types of unsecured claims.121 Section 507(d), however, provides that the subrogor of 
a holder of any of seven of the nine types of § 507(a) claims is not subrogated to the elevated priority 
of the claim.122 Instead, the subrogor has the status of a general unsecured creditor, even though the 
subrogee had higher priority: 
An entity that is subrogated to the rights of a holder of a claim of a kind specified in 
subsection (a)(3) [wage claims], (a)(4) [employee benefit claims], (a)(5) [farmers’ and 
fishermen’s claims], (a)(6), [personal down payment claims]  (a)(7) [alimony and 
child support claims], (a)(8) [tax claims], or (a)(9) [federal depository insurer claims] 
of this section is not subrogated to the right of the holder of such claim to priority 
under such subsection.123 
The two types of claims for which a subrogee is subrogated to 507(a) priority are (1) those claims for 
the administrative expenses of the bankruptcy estate under § 503,124 which are prioritized under 
§507(a)(1),125 and (2) claims for unsecured claims filed under § 502(f) for debts incurred in 
involuntary bankruptcies between the filing of the involuntary petition and the order for relief,126 
which are prioritized under § 507(a)(2).127 
While there might be cause to distinguish between a good faith purchaser and a subrogor, 
who does not necessarily take for value, § 507(d) appears to be an exception to a general rule 
regarding transfers of priority of bankruptcy claims.  The scope of this general rule is not clear:  does 
§ 507(d) imply subrogation to priority in all other situations or just for § 507(a)(1) and (a)(2) claims?     
The better reading is the later one.  Section 507(d) only announces a divergence in 
 
121 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2006). 
122 11 U.S.C. § 507(d) (2006). 
123 11 U.S.C. § 507(d) (2006).  
124 11 U.S.C. § 503 (2006).  
125 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (2006).  
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subrogation to specifically prioritized claims, not from a general principle that a claims’ priority is 
indelible.  This narrow reading is probably preferred, and not just on the principle that the specific 
controls over the general.  Section 507(a)(1) and (a)(2) claims are prioritized for different policy 
reasons from the other types of § 507(a) claims, and § 507(d) apparently distinguishes on this basis.  
Section 507(a)(1) gives special priority to §503 administrative expense claims.  Administrative 
expenses of a bankruptcy estate are given priority status as an incentive to taking the risk of 
extending value to an insolvent entity.   
Likewise, § 507(a)(2) gives special priority to § 502(f) claims for debts incurred between the 
filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition and the order for relief.  Section 502(f) claims are similar 
to administrative expenses, as they too are debts incurred by the bankruptcy estate post-petition.  
Section 502(f) claims involve value that is extended to the estate, not the debtor.  Allowing 
subrogors of administrative creditors to receive the administrative creditors’ priority ensures the 
resale value of administrative claims.  This keeps administrative claims liquid and makes them more 
valuable, which encourages creditors to extend post-petition value to debtors.   
The other types of § 507(a) claims, like those for wages, alimony, child support, and taxes, 
are claims of creditors that extended value before bankruptcy.  These types of claims are not likely to 
be resold—they are either held by unsophisticated parties that lack access to the claims trading 
market or by the government.  These claims receive elevated priority because of Congress’ social 
policy judgment that they are more worthy than other unsecured creditors who extended value pre-
petition.  The factor giving priority for these claims is also intimately connected with the identity of 
the initial claim holder.  Congress wanted to treat spouses and children of bankrupts different from 
other parties.  The same for employees, farmers, fisherman, and the government.  The reason they 
receive the priority inheres in them and cannot be transferred; it is an in personam characteristic.   
 
126 11 U.S.C. § 502(f) (2006).  
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin 
 
36
It is hard to know what to glean from § 507(d), but it is a stretch to read it as implying a 
general indorsement of nemo dat in regard to priority in bankruptcy.  Indeed, § 507(d) involves its 
inverse of nemo dat. Rather than conveying more than one has, § 507(d) means that § 507(a) parties, 
other than those with § 503 and § 502(f) claims, convey less than they have.  Section 507(d) simply 
does not address whether a subrogor gets a subrogee’s priority for claims that do not have § 507(a) 
priority, much less whether this applies to situations beyond subrogation, such as good faith 
purchasers for value.  The better reading of § 507(d) is that it does not speak to nemo dat as a general 
matter in terms of priority of bankruptcy claims, only to a limited question of statutory priority.  
C. NEMO DAT APPLIES ONLY IF THERE IS JUSTIFIED RELIANCE ON PRIORITY 
Because nemo dat is the default rule of property transfers, debtors are justified in relying 
upon it.128 If I take out a loan from the bank, I expect that any defense I have against the bank’s 
enforcement of the debt will also be available to me against anyone the bank sells the loan to.  Nemo 
dat protects borrowers’ justified expectations.  When the law opts out of a nemo dat regime, it is 
only with clear notice, so borrowers do not rely on the ability to raise the same defenses against their 
lenders’ transferees as they do against their lender.  The notice provided by negotiability systems is 
designed to alert borrowers to demand a price reduction in order to part with their rights. 
 Whether nemo dat should apply to questions of priority in bankruptcy depends on whether 
there was justified reliance by creditors.  As a general matter, nemo dat is the principle adopted by 
the law because it is an important protection for obligors against malfeasance by assignors.  Suppose 
A sells B a debt A claims that he is owed by C. If C does not actually owe A the debt, we would not 
want C to be liable to B for it, much less let A walk away with his profit from the resale.  
Accordingly, nemo dat is the baseline rule of law, so C can raise any defense against B that he can 
 
127 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2006).  
128 There is an obvious circularity to this reasoning.  If nemo dat were not the default rule there would be no just reliance.  
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against A. Thus, C does not end up paying a debt that he does not owe.  Nor is B left with the loss.  
B has various contract and tort claims against A, so A does not end up profiting unjustly. Nemo dat 
means caveat emptor for transferees like B, but a transferee of a debt is usually not a consumer, but a 
sophisticated party that is capable of protecting itself.   
Where the law varies from the nemo dat paradigm, it is only with clear notice that changes 
what constitutes justified reliance.  As a general matter, the law strives to protect parties’ justified 
expectations.  This principle is what animates the application of nemo dat or negotiability in non-
bankruptcy contexts.   
For example, UCC Article 3 requires that instruments comply with various formal 
requirements to be negotiable.129 The formal indicia inform a potential holder in due course130 that 
he may enforce his instrument subject only to the “real” defenses of infancy, incapacity, illegality, 
duress, fraud in the factum, discharge in insolvency, other known discharge, suretyship defenses, 
statute of limitations, material alteration of the instrument, and forgery.  “Real” defenses go to the 
validity of the instrument itself, as opposed to the creation transaction, and to whether the obligor 
knew or had the capacity to know it was creating a negotiable instrument, and thus surrendering 
certain defenses.  The holder in due course is not subject to the so-called “personal” defenses, 
namely simple contract defenses, like breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud in the 
inducement, lack of consideration, failure of consideration, theft, failure of a condition precedent, 
mistake, unconscionability, impossibility, and waiver.131 Thus, a debtor who issues a negotiable 
instrument is not justified in relying on having personal defenses against a holder in due course.  
Conversely, a party that purchases a negotiable instrument in good faith is justified in relying on 
 
129 UCC § 3-104 (1991).  
130 The Holder in Due Course is one who obtains an instrument for value and without notice UCC § 3-302(1991). The 
Holder in Due Course is just the good faith purchaser in a UCC Article 3 guise, and good faith in the UCC is nothing 
more than “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”  UCC § 1-201(21) 
(2004). 
131 UCC § 3-305 (1991).   
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protections as a holder in due course.   
The justified reliance principle also determines whether nemo dat will apply in areas of law 
involving priority, such as real estate deeds and security interests (including mortgages).    Real 
estate and security interest both have notice-filing systems.  When a real estate deed or security 
interest is properly filed or perfected, the law imputes constructive notice of its priority to other 
parties.  When the deed or security interest is not properly filed or perfected, no notice is imputed.  
The priority of a recorded deed is generally determined by a first in time, first in right rule, so a 
prospective buyer should search the title filing system to determine if someone other than the seller 
has recorded the deed.  Nemo dat protects the reliance of buyers who search the title system.  
Thus, if A sells Blackacre to B, who does not record the deed, and A subsequently sells 
Blackacre to C, a good faith purchaser who records the deed, C has title to Blackacre, not B.  B is left 
only with tort and contract claims against A.  A search of the recording system tells C that it is safe 
for him to rely on A having good title.132 Because B did not properly record the deed, no notice is 
implied to C, so nemo dat does not apply, and A could transfer more to C than he actually had.  If, on 
the other hand, B had recorded the deed before C, nemo dat would apply in a priority context.  A
would have nothing to convey to C, and B would have priority over C.
A similar situation occurs security interests.  A security interest only gives its holder priority 
over other creditors when it is perfected.133 For a security interest to be perfected is has to be 
properly filed in the UCC recordation system134 or in the physical control of the secured party.135 As 
with real estate, the priority of a perfected security interest is determined by automatic operation of 
law, generally under a first in time to perfect, first in right rule.136 This means that other would-be 
creditors can rely on a search through the UCC filing system to determine what their priority would 
 
132 C will also be protected by warranties of title and the like.   
133 UCC §§ 9-201(a), 9-317 (2001).   
134 UCC § 9-308 (2001).  Certain types of security interests perfect upon attachment. UCC § 9-309 (2001).  
135 UCC § 9-314 (2001).  
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be and make lending decisions based upon this research.  Moreover, perfected security interests 
retain their priority when the collateral is transferred to a another party.137 Therefore, lenders are on 
constructive notice of perfected security interests.  
A party’s reliance on its priority as a result of a search of the UCC system is only justified if 
the priority of the security interests is static.  If a creditor could sell its security interest and the 
purchaser could receive higher priority than the original creditor, then parties would not be secure in 
their security’s priority.  Similarly, if an purchaser of a security interest could receive lower priority 
than the seller, the liquidity of secured debts would be limited.  Accordingly, nemo dat is the 
principle that applies to the priority of perfected security interests. 
This contrasts with the priority of unperfected security interests.  If A had an unperfected 
security interest in B’s widgets, A could assign its security interest to C, who could then perfect it by 
making the proper filing.  C would thus end up with better than A gave.  If creditor D had lent to B
before A and also had an unperfected security interest in the widgets, D would have stood equal with 
A in a bankruptcy, but D would stand behind C once C had perfected.  In both real estate title and 
security interests, nemo dat governs transfers of priority only if there is an appropriate filing in a 
constructive notice-filing system upon which other purchasers or creditors can rely.  Nemo dat does 
not apply when there is no justified reliance because either the form of the debt provides the debtor 
with notice that he is surrendering rights or there is not a proper filing in a notice-filing system.  
The justified reliance principle also guides the application of nemo dat in bankruptcy law.  
While no court before Enron had ruled on the whether nemo dat applied to equitably determined 
priority, the Supreme Court has held that nemo dat applies to statutorily determined priority (with the 
obvious exclusion of § 507(d)).  In Shropshire, Woodlife, & Co. v. Bush, the Court held that an 
assigned wage claim retained its § 507(a)(3) priority after assignment because the “character of the 
 
136 UCC § 9-322 (2001).  
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debts was fixed when they were incurred, and could not be changed by an assignment.”138 
The priority of a claim is for wages is fixed by statute when it accrues.  Other creditors have 
notice of what the wage claim’s priority is and lend on this knowledge.  Similarly, a purchaser of the 
wage claim can rely on the claim’s priority in determining its expected value.  All creditors are on 
notice of statutory priority before they lend, just as they are of the priority of a recorded deed or 
perfected security interest.  Accordingly, their reliance on the priority is justified and nemo dat is an 
appropriate legal standard because it protects the creditors’ justified reliance.  
In contrast, a claim’s equitable priority is not fixed when the debt is incurred.  Indeed, 
whether to equitably subordinate a claim is reserved for the court’s discretion, as is the amount of the 
subordination.139 And, under Enron, because a claim may be equitably subordinated for its holder’s 
unrelated behavior, the inequitable behavior that would alter the claim’s priority could occur after 
the debt is incurred.  Equitable priority is not a fixed characteristic of a claim.  Accordingly, creditors 
never lend in reliance of priority resulting from a future equitable subordination.  While a claims 
purchaser might theoretically purchase claims that have already been subordinated, once claims’ 
equitable priority has been determined, there is notice and nemo dat should apply.  The point is 
manifest:  claims purchasers should not bear reduced priority because the claims could have been 
subordinated in the hands of a previous holder.  As long as the claims were not actually subordinated 
 
137 UCC § 9-325 (2001). 
138 204 U.S. 186, 189 (1907).  See also Wilson v. Brooks Supermarket, Inc. (In re Missionary Baptist Found., Inc.), 667 
F.2d 1244, 1247 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding  wage claims retained priority in hands of assignee check indorsee); Carnegia v. 
Ga. Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 691 F.2d 482, 483 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that a non-dischargable student loan 
remains non-dischargeable in hands of assignee); In re Zipco, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 675, 677 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (holding 
 wage claims retained priority in hands of assignee stockholder), aff'd sub nom. Bass v. Shutan, 259 F.2d 561, 563 (9th 
Cir. 1958); Dorr Pump & Mfg. Co. v. Heath (In re Dorr Pump & Mfg. Co.), 125 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir. 1942) (holding 
wage claims retained priority in hands of assignee director and shareholder).  But see SEC v. Albert & Maguire Sec. Co., 
560 F.2d 569, 570 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that a bank assignee of a customer’s claim in a Securities Investor Protection 
Act liquidation is not subrogated to the customer’s priority if the equities are contradindicative).   Courts have also held 
that assignees retain assignors’ rights, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Tele Resources, Inc., 724 F.2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(holding that assignee succeeds to assignors’ defenses); In re Elliott, 385 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (M.D. La. 1974) (finding 
that assignee acquires all transferor's rights of action).   
139 E.g., Gregory v. Finova Captial Corp, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 6117, *16 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006); Bayer Corp. v. Mascotech, 
Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 744 (6th Cir. 2001) (equitable subordination is not mandatory, even if 
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in the previous holder’s hands, their equitable priority was not fixed, so it should not transfer with 
the claims, especially when the previous holder’s inequitable behavior was unrelated to the claims in 
question.  
The justified reliance principle shows that Enron erred in applying nemo dat to the priority of 
the Fleet loan participation claims.  Even if the loan participation claims could have been 
subordinated in Fleet’s hands, they should not have been subordinated in the Funds’.  None of 
Enron’s creditors relied on the Seller Banks’ subordination when lending.  In Enron, the loan 
participations were first lien secured.140 Other creditors, therefore, were on constructive notice on 
the debt’s existence in terms of their bankruptcy priority and had to assume that they were of lower 
priority.  Any reliance on the loans’ existence was in terms of Enron’s leverage and thus its 
bankruptcy risk and potential unsecured assets in bankruptcy, not the other creditors’ priority in 
bankruptcy.  Any harm incurred by other creditors was not from the existence of Fleet’s claim141 or 
its priority, but from its alleged inequitable action.  The proper remedy for this situation is a tort 
action against the inequitable party.142 
Direct tort actions by the injured creditors present the best remedy for inequitable behavior 
by a former creditor that has sold its claims because it results in proper cost internalization.  Because 
not all creditors were necessarily injured by the inequitable behavior, only the ones who were injured 
should benefit from a suit.  If a direct suit is brought by the bankruptcy estate or a subordination 
action is undertaken, other, uninjured creditors might reap a windfall.  Moreover, direct suits by 
injured creditors force the inequitable party to internalize the costs of its behavior, rather than 
imposing the costs on innocent claims purchasers who must sue up the chain of title to make good 
their loss.   
 
all elements of Mobile Steel test are met); Aetna Bank v. Dvorak (In re McDonald Creek Dev. Co.), 176 B.R. 160, 166 
(N.D. Ill. 1994); Allied Tech., Inc. v. R.B. Brunemann & Sons, Inc., 25 B.R. 484, 499 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). 
140 Enron, 333 B.R. at 212.   
141 If the claim were the product of sufficiently bad behavior, it should be disallowed.   
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D. THE LIMITATIONS OF LEAST-COST AVOIDER ANALYSIS 
The justified reliance principle often coincides with the economic goal of identifying the 
least-cost avoider of the problem and placing the risk-burden on that least-cost avoider.  Thus, the 
least-cost avoider of a misunderstanding in a deed or security interest notice-filing system is the 
party that received its property right first, but failed to record it.  Accordingly, that party bears the 
risk of a subsequent purchaser or interest holder recording first and obtaining title or priority.  
Similarly, the maker of a note is in the best position to control whether the note is negotiable or not, 
so the maker bears the risk of having limited defenses against transferees of the note if she does not 
ensure that the note is non-negotiable.   
But there are cases in which there either is no least-cost avoider or the least-cost avoider is 
indeterminate, and in these cases, legal, rather than economic principles dictate allocation of risk.  
This is the case with equitable subordination of bankruptcy claims.  Only the claims’ purchaser is in 
a position to investigate whether the claims are tainted, but it is not clear whether this can be 
successfully done on a cost-efficient basis.  Even if it can, the failure of the purchaser to take care 
results not only in a loss to the purchaser, but also in a windfall to other creditors, who did not rely 
on the equitably subordinated priority of the claims when they lent.  Equitable subordination may 
aim to punish, but the subordination of a transferee punishes an innocent party, not the wrongdoer, 
and creates a windfall for other creditors.   
Equitable subordination of bankruptcy claims in the hands of good faith transferees pits two 
fundamentally innocent parties against each other:  the transferee and the other creditors.  As 
between innocents, bankruptcy law divides risk in other cases.  Thus, the risk of a preferential 
payment being voided is on the payee, but only for 90 days (one year in the case of insiders).143 
Thereafter, the risk of assets leaving the estate in a preferential payment switches to the other 
 
142 Levitin, supra note 41, at 404-411.  
143 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).  
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creditors.  While this sort of risk sharing works for preferences, it is not practical for equitable 
subordination.  A relatively straightforward forensic accounting can determine whether a payment 
was a preference or not, so it is reasonable to force the innocent creditors to be vigilant for 90 days.  
But inequitable behavior is much harder to define and discern.  Often, equitable subordination 
actions are brought well into the course of Chapter 11 bankruptcies as investigations proceed.  The 
temporal division of risk that the Code employs for preferences is not practical for equitable 
subordination because of the prolonged uncertainty it would produce.  A bright-line rule that protects 
transferees would eliminate such costly uncertainty.  The principle that ultimately guides such a rule 
is that of justified reliance, not the least-cost avoider.   
E. WHAT CONSTITUTES JUSTIFIED RELIANCE ON PRIORITY?
While the justified reliance principle is the guide for determining whether nemo dat applies to 
a property transfer, the question remains as to what constitutes justified reliance.  Put another way, 
when is a party on notice of equitable priority?   
The Restatement (Second) on Contracts and UCC Article 9 both answer this question in 
terms of when the equities accrue.  A transferee is only subject to the equities that accrue before the 
obligor receives notice of the transfer.144 The Restatement and the UCC do not explain when 
equities accrue.  The Supreme Court’s 1906 ruling in Fidelity Mutual Insurance Co. v. Clark,145 one 
of the principal cases relied upon by Enron as support for the application of nemo dat,146 illustrates 
when equities accrue.   
In Clark, a Texan named Hunter and his widowed sister, Mettler, contrived to defraud 
 
144 Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts § 336(2) (1981); UCC § 9-318(1) (2001). Compare Restatement (First) 
of the Law of Contracts, § 167(1) (1962) (“An assignee’s right against the obligor is subject to all limitations of the 
obligee’s right . . . provided that such defenses . . . are based on facts existing at the time of the assignment, or are based 
on facts arising thereafter prior to knowledge of the assignment by the obligor.”).   
145 203 U.S. 64, 74 (1906) (Holmes, J.). 
146 Enron, 333 B.R. at 223.   
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Fidelity.147 Hunter took out three life insurance policies on himself from Fidelity, and named 
Mettler, as beneficiary.148 Hunter was then falsely reported as dead, although the body was never 
found,149 and Mettler engaged an attorney, Clark, to collect the insurance proceeds.  Clark, unaware 
of the scheme, took an assignment of a one-third interest in the policies as his fee.150 Clark then 
further assigned and mortgaged his interest151 before winning a collection judgment for Mettler 
against Fidelity.152 
After paying out the policies, Fidelity learned that reports of Hunter’s death had been greatly 
exaggerated.  Fidelity then sued to recover the payments under the policies from Mettler and the 
various assignees.153 Clark and his subsequent assignees argued that he was a good faith purchaser 
of the one-third interest in the policy and that he was therefore entitled to keep the proceeds.    
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, noted that Clark had properly acquired legal title to the 
proceeds, and, to recover the proceeds, Fidelity “must show some equity before [Clark’s] legal title 
can be disturbed,”154 which meant showing that Clark took the assignment either with notice or 
without having given value.155 Because Clark clearly gave value in the form of his services, Fidelity 
argued that he took with notice of the equities in the case.  The Court disagreed, noting that  
the equities to which an assignee takes subject are equities existing at the time of the 
assignment and . . . the notice with which he is supposed to be charged as an assignee 
can be of nothing more . . ..  The policies were honest contracts[,] and it was an 
interest in the policies which was assigned . . ..156 
This is the same rule as the Restatement and the UCC Article 9.  Unlike the Restatement or UCC, 
 
147 Clark, 203 U.S. at 72. 
148 Fidelity Mut. Life Assoc. v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308 (1902). 
149 The 1902 Supreme Court case dealt with the adequacy of the evidence of his death by drowning in the Pecos river in 
the Texas brush when no body was recovered.  In the 1902 case, the Supreme Court upheld the circuit court’s affirmation 
of the judgment that there was proof of Hunter’s death.  Id. 
150 Clark, 203 U.S. at 72. 
151 Id. at 72-73. 
152 Id. at 73. 
153 Id. at 72.   
154 Id. at 73. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 74.   
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Clark shows how the rule applies.  The Supreme Court emphasized that “notice of the denial that 
Hunter was dead, in the suit on the policy” was not notice of the fraud because Clark believed 
Mettler’s case.157 Indeed, the Court noted that even if Fidelity had responded in the original 
collection suit with an affirmative defense alleging fraud, it would not have constituted sufficient 
notice to Clark to vitiate his good faith purchaser defense.158 
Clark refines nemo dat to mean that an assignee stands in no better position than the rights of 
the assignor as they exist at the time of the assignment.159 The fact that an assignor is later found to 
have engaged in behavior that would have impugned the rights transferred had they been in the 
assignor’s hands does not apply against the assignee, if the assignee took for value and without 
notice.160 An assignee does not take subject to contingent equities.  Equities accrue when they are 
proven, rather than when they are theoretical or alleged. 
This means that Fleet’s negative equities did not accrue in Enron until the court had 
determined that Fleet could be subordinated, so they did not attach to the loan participation claims.  
In Enron, the Funds purchased the claim before there was any allegation, much less proof, of 
inequitable behavior by Fleet.  Thus, the equities did not accrue with the filing of the Megacomplaint 
nor at the time of Fleet’s behavior, unless the Funds were aware of Fleet’s actions and believed them 
to taint its claims.  Under Clark, the Funds should not be subject to the contingent equities of the 
claim, only to those actually shown.  A fortiori, they should not be subject to Fleet’s equities 
unrelated to the claim. 
F. CAN A BANKRUPTCY CLAIM EVER BE PURCHASED IN GOOD FAITH?
Enron might still be differentiated from Clark because it held that the Funds could not be 
 
157 Clark, 203 U.S. at 74. 
158 Id. 
159 Clark, 203 U.S. at 74.  See generally, Grant Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security,
74 YALE L.J. 217 (1964). 
160 Clark, 203 U.S. at 74.  
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good faith purchasers because they had purchased bankruptcy claims. Even if there were a good faith 
purchaser defense to § 510(c), the Funds could not avail themselves of it because by purchasing 
bankruptcy claims, they had notice of the possibility of subordination.  “The purchase of a claim 
itself[] evidences the transferee’s willingness to assume the risks attendant to a bankruptcy 
proceeding,”161 so a transferee of bankruptcy claims “is on notice that any defense or right of the 
debtor, including equitable subordination, may be asserted against that claim.”162 
The Bankruptcy Code does not contain a definition of “good faith.”  Instead, courts have 
determined it on a case-by-case basis, searching for the indicia of an arms-length transaction.163 
There was no evidence of the Fund’s active, knowing collusion in an attempt to launder Fleet’s 
claims.164 Instead, Enron held that the very nature of bankruptcy claims trading precluded good faith 
purchases because buyers were always on notice of the possibility of subordination.165 
Rather than showing why the Funds should not be good faith purchasers, Clark shows that 
they were.  The Funds purchased their claims before the Megacomplaint.  This puts them in as good 
a position as Clark, who received his assignment before there was any allegation of inequitable 
behavior.   
Nor does the possibility of subordination does not distinguish Enron from Clark, because 
there was also the possibility of a fraud action in Clark. Although only bankruptcy claims are 
subject to § 510(c) actions, all legal claims for money—choses in action—are subject to a variety of 
defenses and may turn out to be worthless.  Accordingly, the class action plaintiffs’ bar regularly 
syndicates interests in lawsuits, as if they were loan participations, in order to diversify their 
litigation portfolios precisely because of the risk that any particular suit will be dismissed and have 
 
161 Enron, 333 B.R. at 229. 
162 Id. at 235.   
163 Brown v. Third Nat’l Bank (In re Sherman), 67 F.3d 1348, 1355 (8th Cir. 1995). 
164 Id. at 213. 
165 Id. at 229, 234-35. 
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no value.  Given the discretionary nature of equitable subordination,166 the Funds were arguably on 
even less notice than Clark about the impairment to chose in action they purchased.  A legal risk, 
even when litigation has commenced, does not constitute notice under Clark.
Moreover, there was not a known legal risk of subordination before the Enron decision.167 
The Bankruptcy Court was unable to cite a case in which the inequitable behavior of a party 
unrelated to a bankruptcy claim was grounds for subordination of the claim in the hands of a 
secondary or tertiary transferee.  Enron broke new legal ground, and in order to do so it required a 
presumption that the legal ground had already been broken.  The Funds should not have been 
excluded from good faith purchaser status solely because they purchased bankruptcy claims.  They 
took the claims for value and without notice that the claims were subordinatable.   
Enron appears to have adopted an irrebutable presumption168 that bankruptcy claims cannot 
be traded in good faith in order to prevent “claims washing,” the selling at full market value of a 
subordinatable claim by an inequitable actor to a party in whose hands the claim could not be 
subordinated.  The development of the claims market has greatly affected the dynamics of corporate 
reorganizations, and is viewed with askance by many practitioners and judges whose formative 
professional experiences pre-date mass claims trading.169 Whatever one thinks about the influence 
 
166 See, e.g., Bayer Corp., 269 F.3d at 744 (equitable subordination is not mandatory, even if all elements of Mobile Steel 
test are met). 
167 Enron’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Leave to Appeal form the Bankruptcy 
Court’s Decisions Concerning Equitable Subordination of Transferred Claims, No. 05-01029 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 
200[6]), at 8, cites Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, supra note 4, 
at 14, as evidence that the risk of subordination of transferred claims was well known since 1990.  Fortgang and Mayer, 
however, cited only one case, Goldie  v. Cox, 135 F.2d at 720, discussed supra page 22, which does not actually support 
the proposition, and also included a “but see” citation to a more recent decision, Holt v. FDIC (In re CTS Truss, Inc.),
868 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1989). The paucity of supporting case law should give pause to treating  
Fortgang and Mayers as making a definitive positive statement of law. 
168 333 B.R. at 226.  
169 For example, in the companion decision to Enron that denied the Funds’ motion to dismiss Enron’s action to disallow 
the Funds’ claims under 11 U.S.C. § 502(d), Judge Gonzalez declared that “the claims trading market is not a 
fundamental part of the bankruptcy process, its policies, historical roots, or purpose.” Enron Corp. v. Avenue Special 
Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron), 340 B.R. 180, 204 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).  This statement is inaccurate.  Claim 
trading has deep historic roots in bankruptcies and equity receiverships.  Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking 
Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, supra note 4, at 9-13. It is true, however, that the Bankruptcy Code was not 
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of claims trading on the reorganization process, it is not clear why there should be an irrebutable 
presumption of bad faith for claims trades.   
Setting aside hoary concerns about champerty, maintenance, and barratry,170 even in an old-
fashioned equity context, there is no reason to presume lack of good faith when trading claims post-
petition, as the same economic transaction could have occurred pre-petition.  Should it really matter 
that the Funds acquired the loan participation claims post-petition in the form of bankruptcy claims, 
rather than as pre-petition distressed debt?  In the later case, the Funds would have be purchasing, if 
not a bankruptcy claim, then at least a high likelihood of holding a bankruptcy claim.   
There are legitimate reasons for claims purchases, as Enron itself recognized.171 To tar all 
claims purchases with the irrebutable presumption of bad faith is a significant policy decision that a 
court should hesitate to do without serious consideration.  A good guidepost for what constitutes 
good faith in commercial transactions is the UCC.  The UCC defines good faith as “honesty in fact 
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”172 By this definition, the 
Funds were good faith purchasers of Fleet’s loan participation claims.   
 
drafted with claims trading in mind, but the Bankruptcy Rules have allow for claims trading and have been revised to 
make claims trading easier. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (2006). 
Emphasizing the historic marginality of claims trading in the bankruptcy process misses the reality of today—
claims trading is an essential feature of the reorganization process, and limitations on it have real effects, not just on 
individual reorganizations, but on the bankruptcy process in general and on capital markets as a whole.  To declare that 
claims trading is not a fundamental part of the bankruptcy process’ policies or purpose is to presume that one knows the 
unstated policies of bankruptcy and knows the ultimate impact of claims trading.  There is a lively debate within the 
academic and practitioner community about both what the policy goals of bankruptcy are and should be, see Douglas G. 
Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 574-580 (1998) (giving a taxonomy of the debate), and 
about the effects of claims trading on reorganizations. See supra note 6.  However a particular judge feels about who the 
winners and losers are as a result of increased claims trading should not determine the outcome of legal questions. 
170 Elliot Assocs., L.P., v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding New York state champerty statute 
does not apply to bankruptcy claims trading). Many courts no longer recognize causes of action for champerty, 
maintenance, or barratry, holding that they have been replaced by actions for malicious prosecution and the like.  E.g.,
Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107, 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); PSI Metals, Inc. v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark 
N.J., 839 F.2d 42, 43 (2nd Cir. 1998) (applying New York law); Tosi v. Jones, 685 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d 
1996); McCullar v. Credit Bureau Sys., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Ky. 1992); Sec. Underground Storage, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 347 F.2d 964, 969 (10th Cir. 1965) (applying Kansas law); but see Weigel Broad. Co. v. Howard Topel, 1985 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23862, No. 83-C-7921 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that, under Illinois law, a cause of action for 
maintenance exists but explaining that it is so rare in modern times that the law on the subject is neither settled nor clear). 
171 Enron, 333 B.R. at 226.  
172 UCC § 1-201(20) (2004) (adopted by Idaho, Texas, and Virginia).  The older version of the UCC, still in force in 46 
states, defines good faith as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”  UCC § 1-201(19) (year).   
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We should not lightly brush aside of the concerns of abusive claims trading.  Rather than 
adopt an irrebutable presumption of bad faith for all bankruptcy claims purchases without any reason 
for distinguishing them from pre-petition distressed debt purchases, we should adopt a rebuttable 
presumption of good faith.  This presumption could have certain exceptions, such as claims trading 
by fiduciaries of the debtor, claims trading to gain corporate control of the debtor, resale-sellbacks, 
and claims trading in which the purchaser has neither conducted any diligence nor acquired a 
warranty of equitable behavior.  In such circumstances, the burden of showing good faith should rest 
on the claims’ purchaser or the court should undertake a more exacting scrutiny of the transaction.  
Moreover, in when a claims purchaser has acquired the claims as part of a transaction or connected 
series of transactions that results in its acquisition of substantially all assets of former claims holder, 
it should assume the same equities and priority of the former holder.173 Alternatively, bankruptcy 
law could imply a warranty of equitable behavior in all claims trades, which would have to be 
explicitly disavowed.  Either way would be more sensible than declaring an entire market to be 
tainted by bad faith. 
Enron was a flawed decision from a doctrinal matter.  It applied nemo dat to a situation in 
which the rule’s protections are not needed.  Nemo dat should be applied only to questions of priority 
when there was (at least theoretically) justified reliance on priority set before a decision to lend.  
Because equitable subordination always affects priority after creditors have lent, there can never be 
justified reliance, so nemo dat should not apply to equitable subordination.   
The doctrinal problems with Enron have real world consequences.  As the next section 
shows, Enron’s erroneous application of nemo dat has had serious negative consequences on 
liquidity in the bankruptcy claims market.  Because of the unique role of the bankruptcy claims 
market as the residual capital market, these liquidity problems have been amplified into other capital 
 
173 See Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (looking to substance over form of 
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markets, and generally increase borrowers’ bankruptcy risks.  Enron applied nemo dat to priority 
with the aim of protecting, but it actually hurt them by making debtors more likely to default and file 
for bankruptcy.  
V. NEMO DAT’S SYSTEMIC COSTS ON MARKET LIQUIDITY THROUGH ENRON174 
A. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS MARKET IN PROMOTING LIQUIDITY IN CAPITAL 
MARKETS 
Liquidity in the bankruptcy claims market is important to creditors for numerous legitimate 
reasons.  As Enron recognized, creditors sell their claims: 
to avoid the administrative hassle and costs of bankruptcy proceedings; or to establish 
a tax loss on their investment; or meet the regulatory requirements, including Basel 
Accord capital requirement, auditing rules for balance sheet asset write-offs or mark-
to-market accounting requirements for securities.175 
Many creditors do not want to be claim holders throughout a bankruptcy because of the legal and 
opportunity costs involved, and are happy to sell their claims at a discount.  
 The existence of a market in bankruptcy claims is important for the health of distressed debt 
(and indirectly all debt and equity) markets.  If there were no bankruptcy claims market, creditors 
would be more reluctant to deal with distressed or high-risk companies because of the possibility that 
they would be left holding bankruptcy claims of uncertain value and forced to incur the expense and 
inconvenience of being claim holders.  The bankruptcy claims market allows creditors to exit the 
bankruptcy process before plan confirmation.  This makes creditors more willing to extend credit in 
the first place.  The existence of the secondary market in bankruptcy claims thus increases the 
liquidity of regular debt and equity markets and makes it easier for companies to raise capital.  
Therefore, any legal rule that decreases the liquidity of the bankruptcy claims market affects non-
bankruptcy markets and makes it harder for distressed companies to raise capital, which exacerbates 
 
transaction for taxation purposes).  
174 This section (V) derives from Levitin, supra note 41. 
175Enron, 333 B.R. at 226 n.8. 
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financial distress and makes bankruptcies more likely.   
Enron has decreased liquidity in the throughout capital markets by promulgating a legal rule 
that creating a new type of counterparty risk.  Counterparty risk is the risk entailed by dealing with a 
particular transaction partner—in this case, the risk that the transaction partner is selling an impaired 
asset. Post-Enron, claims purchasers must worry not just about sellers’ title, but also about sellers’ 
interactions with the debtor unrelated to the claim.  This concern extends not just to the direct seller, 
but also to all holders up the chain of title, as Enron involved the subordination not just of primary, 
but also of secondary and tertiary transferees.176 Under Enron, the identity of a trading partner 
matters, as does the identity of every previous holder of a claim.  The identity and actions of all 
parties up the chain of title continues to matter throughout the duration of a bankruptcy.  The risk is 
not divided between the parties through a statute of limitations; unlike for preferences177 and 
fraudulent transfers,178 there is no statute of limitations on equitable subordination.   
The doctrinal and policy analyses that supported Enron are questionable, but the most serious 
problem with the decision is the uncertainty that it has injected into the distressed debt markets.  
Adopting a nemo dat regime for bankruptcy claims’ priority, has effects that spill over into other 
markets.  Enron’s counterparty risk has raised the cost of transactions not just in the bankruptcy 
claims market, but in several other credit markets.  Increased transaction costs means that there will 
be fewer transactions on the margins and thus the liquidity of the credit markets will contract.  
Although Enron itself dealt with a relatively limited fact pattern, no one is sure what its limits are.  
At the very least, it affects credit default swaps and loan participations.  But its trajectory presents a 
slippery slope that implicates all securities, debt, and derivative transactions.   
 
176 Id. at 212. The iniquity, or in this case, the inequity, of the fathers is visited upon the sons to (at least) the third and 
fourth generation.  The iniquity, or in this case, the inequity, of the fathers is visited upon the sons to (at least) the third 
and fourth generation. 
177 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).  
178 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006).    
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B. ENRON’S EFFECT ON OTHER MARKETS 
1.  The Bankruptcy Claims Trading Market 
 
Bankruptcy claims traders are extremely sophisticated financial players who regularly engage 
in risk valuation.  Enron counterparty risk presents a unique problem for the market, though.  There 
is a qualitative difference to subordination risk, and claims traders do not know how to account for it.  
Inequitable behavior is judged by a “soft,” in-the-eye-of-the-beholder standard.  Whether a party 
behaved inequitably is a judgment call, not a matter of black letter law.  Thus, claims purchasers lack 
reliable information for calculating the statistical probability of subordination of a particular claim.  
They do not have sufficient information about any particular upstream claim holder’s actions, and 
even if they did, they cannot calculate the magnitude of damages caused by the inequitable behavior.  
And in electronic OTC markets, like bond trading, the trades are typically anonymous, so it is 
impossible to learn about upstream holders.   
Nor can claims purchasers evaluate the residual value of claims should they turn out to be 
tainted.  If a claim is subordinated, the purchaser can sue up the chain of title until the inequitable 
party is brought into the litigation.  Ultimately, the value of such a suit depends on the 
creditworthiness of the subordinated purchaser’s transferor.  If the transferor is insolvent, the claims 
purchaser will have a claim in the transferor’s bankruptcy—and a likely recovery of cents on the 
dollar.  Claims purchasers do not typically have sufficient information on counterparties’ 
creditworthiness; the transaction is an asset purchase, not a loan, so detailed financial diligence is 
neither offered nor expected.  Even the most sophisticated financial actors do not know how to 
account for Enron’s counterparty subordination risk.   
It is hard to evaluate the trade-off between increased bankruptcy risk for all creditors and 
increased counterparty risk for claims purchasers on the one hand versus increased protection from 
inequitable creditors in bankruptcy on the other.  Neither the increased bankruptcy risk nor the value 
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of protection from claim washing can be quantified.  The arbitrariness of this trade-off makes Enron 
a questionable decision from a market perspective.  It forces creditors to accept legally mandated 
“insurance” against claim washing at the price of more debtors filing for bankruptcy.   
Neither creditors nor debtors would likely opt into such an “insurance” system voluntarily.  
Creditors have other methods of protecting themselves.  Ex-ante options include secured debt, 
sureties, and credit derivatives, while ex-post, they can undertake direct actions against the 
inequitable parties.  Nor can creditors cannot easily anticipate which side of the equitable 
subordination divide they might find themselves, but are not likely to assume that they have engaged 
in wrongdoing.  Finally, most creditors would prefer not to deal with a bankruptcy than have greater 
protections in bankruptcy.  The same is true of debtors.  Neither debtors’ management nor ownership 
would prefer greater protection for creditors in bankruptcy to a lower risk of bankruptcy because in a 
bankruptcy the management and ownership are frequently replaced.   
It is also probably impossible to conduct adequate diligence against Enron’s counterparty risk 
in some situations, such as when the claims seller is a large financial institution that could have 
interacted with the borrower in myriad ways over a lengthy period.  A bank like Fleet, or any of the 
mediary transferees in Enron, could have served as a underwriter of a debtor’s securities offerings, a 
broker or market maker in the debtor’s securities, a trustee for the debtor’s pension plan, a 
participant in a loan to the debtor, a direct lender to the debtor, or as the debtor’s adviser on a merger 
or acquisition.  Given the merger trend among financial institutions, a claim seller’s inequitable 
behavior could have been committed by what was then a separate institution, making diligence 
harder because of non-uniform records and limited institutional memory.  Moreover, diligence is 
extremely difficult for equitable subordination because equitable subordination does not require 
illegal behavior.  Frequently subordination is for legal, but untoward acts.  It is not realistic to expect 
the people who actually do the diligence—junior associates in document rooms—to have the 
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judgment to discern what is equitable and what is not.  It is a legal grey area.179 
Enron will also have a marginal effect on who is involved in the reorganization drama.  The 
past decades have seen the rise of distressed debt investors—so-called “vulture” or “phoenix” funds, 
like the Funds in Enron. Distressed debt investors have come to play an increasingly important role 
in reorganizations, and there is considerable debate as to whether their presence furthers or hinders 
the reorganization process.180 Enron will limit the involvement of distressed debt investors, although 
one suspects that the impact will be marginal.  The proper role for distressed debt investors is a 
policy decision, not a legal one, and is better addressed by Congress than a court.    
Enron will also affect the balance of power within reorganizations.  The increased 
counterparty risk will increase the leverage of debtors and creditors committees when negotiating 
with claims purchasers, further reducing the power of distressed debt investors in reorganizations.  
Whether this is a positive result depends on one’s view of the influence of distressed debt investors 
on reorganizations, but it represents a reversal of the increasing strength of distressed debt investors 
in the reorganization process.    
Enron might also impact venue choice.181 All things being equal, distressed debt investors 
are more likely to purchase claims of a bankruptcy in a district that has not adopted Enron.  This 
means that more distressed debt investment will flow to jurisdictions like Delaware, if Enron is 
upheld in the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit.  Debtors that want to avoid 
dealing with distressed investors would likely prefer filings in the Southern District of New York, 
but if the choice of filing is influenced by a large creditor (usually the DIP-lender-to-be), and this 
lender wants to have many exit possibilities, venues other than the Southern District will be more 
appealing.  
 
179 Risk aversion and agency problems may also complicate attempts to diligence against equitable subordination.  
180 See supra note 6. 
181 See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY 
COURTS (2005).  
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Enron will also affect the liquidity and pricing of different types and sizes of bankruptcy 
claims differently.  Enron increases the value of claims that travel with subordination indemnities or 
warranties, like loan participation claims, relative to those that do not, like bonds and trade claims, 
although one has to question what these indemnities and warranties are worth in light of the expense 
that would be involved in litigating them.  It will increase the relative value of diversified synthetic 
instruments like securitizations and may encourage the development of securitized bundles of 
bankruptcy claims.  It also places new emphasis on the creditworthiness of the indemnitor.  Claims 
purchasers will now have cause to look into seller’s finances, or take out insurance, in the form of 
credit default swaps on the seller, adding transaction costs to deals, which will decrease the marginal 
number of deals. 
It is unclear how Enron will affect claims trading in terms of size of claims purchases.  Most 
likely, it will make small claims less liquid.  Some claims purchasers may choose to protect 
themselves from subordination risk by diversifying to minimize the impact of any particular 
subordination.  This strategy would call for purchasing smaller claims.  Yet, distressed investors 
often invest to achieve negotiating leverage and shape the outcome of a reorganization plan or gain 
an advantage in the sale of an estate asset.  In such situations, a small claim is of limited value, as it 
will provide insufficient leverage.  Enron alters the dynamics of the bankruptcy claims market, 
which is an essential part of the health of all capital markets.   
2.  Credit Default Swaps 
 
Enron increases counterparty risk in the derivative market in credit default swaps.  Credit 
default swaps are an OTC derivative that insures against a borrower’s default through the sale of the 
default risk separate from ownership of the loan.182 A lender (the protection buyer) enters into a 
credit default swap with a party (the protection seller) that promises to purchase the loan at par if the 
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borrower (the reference entity) defaults during the typically short-term duration of the swap contract.  
Thus, if bank X is worried about a loan made to Enron, it could enter into a credit default swap with 
bank Y, which would have to pay X the par value of the loan upon default, and Y would become the 
owner of the defaulted loan.  More typically, X would retain ownership of the loan, and would 
instead purchase Enron bonds with a face value equal to that of the loan, which it would then transfer 
to Y. In perfect market conditions, the market value of the bonds will be the same as that of the loan 
itself.183 Credit default swaps give lenders the ability to transform low quality debt into high quality 
debt by substituting the default risk of the swap counterparty for that of the reference debtor.184 
If bank Y has to investigate every party with which it enters into credit default swaps to 
determine that they are not a “bad actor” in relation to the borrower, it will raise the price of credit 
default swaps, and thus the cost of borrowing, which will in turn prevent some otherwise beneficial 
transactions from occurring.  Credit default swaps have grown into a major OTC derivatives market 
in the past decade.  At the end of 2005, there were $17.1 trillion in notional outstandings for credit 
default swaps.185 Credit default swaps are important for the liquidity of the bankruptcy claims 
market because they provide an exit market for small bondholders, whose positions are purchased by 
protection buyers to cover their swap obligations.  The availability of credit default swaps also helps 
creditors limit their lending exposure, thereby lowering costs to borrowers.  Not only does Enron 
increase the cost of raising capital by restricting liquidity in the bankruptcy claims market, it does so 
too by raising the cost of credit insurance devices like credit default swaps.    
3.  Loan Participations 
 
Enron also creates problems for loan participations.  The standardized loan participation 
 
182 See Stephen J. Lubben, “Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11,” working paper, June 4, 2006, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=906613.   
183 Id. at 30-31.   
184 Id. at 29.   
185 International Swap and Derivative Association, 2005 Year-End Market Survey.   
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transfer documentation only includes upstream chains of title,186 warranties of good behavior187 and 
non-impairment,188 or indemnities189 for the transfer of distressed loans.  Loans trading at par or near 
par (to approximately 90 cents on the dollar) lack such protections.  The distressed loan market is 
less liquid because of purchaser protections, and this hurts distressed companies’ ability to raise 
capital and makes bankruptcies more likely. 
 Purchaser protections, including chains of title, on a distressed loan participation extend only 
to the time the loan began to trade using distressed documentation.190 Most debt does not begin its 
life as distressed, so the purchaser of distressed debt can only trace chains of title up to the time that 
the debt became distressed.  The purchaser has no guarantees regarding the behavior of prior holders 
when the debt was not distressed.  In the case of Enron, the Short Term Credit Agreement was not 
distressed debt when issued.  Had Fleet sold its share of the participation when it was still trading at 
par, the Funds might never have known that Fleet had held the participation, much less been able to 
conduct diligence on Fleet.   
Of course, one could change the practices of loan participation trading to make par loans 
 
186 Upstream transactions are covered by the following provision in the standard forms of the Loan Syndication & 
Trading Association (LSTA).  If the transaction is a secondary assignment, the seller 
 
makes the representation and warranty set for in Section B of the Transaction Specific Terms as to the 
type of Predecessor Transfer Agreements executed in connection with Seller’s purchase of the 
Transferred Rights.  With respect to the portion (if any) of the Transferred Rights that Seller or any 
Prior Seller acquired pursuant to Predecessor Transfer Agreements relating to distressed loans, Seller 
has provided to Buyer (A) true, correct and complete copies of each such Predecessor Transfer 
Agreement to which Seller is a party and (b) to the extent and in the form received by Seller from 
Immediate Prior Seller, any other Predecessor Transfer Agreements specified in the Annex. 
 
LSTA, Loan Syndication & Trading Association’s Standard Terms and Conditions for Distressed Trade Confirmations,
§ 4.1(r)(ii) (May 2005) (emphasis added). 
187 For “flip” transactions involving a riskless party that purchases a loan participation and turns around to sell it within 
one business day of settlement, or “step-up” transactions, in which a seller “steps-up” to guarantee a previous distressed 
trade improperly made on par/near par documentation, LSTA, Publication Memorandum: New Forms of Distressed 
Purchase and Sale Agreement, Par/Near Par and Distressed Trade Confirmations and Trade Checklist, May 2005, at 2), 
the distressed debt warranty against acts and omissions that would cause equitable subordination, LSTA, Loan 
Syndication & Trading Association’s Standard Terms and Conditions for Distressed Trade Confirmations, § 4.1(h)(i) 
(May 2005), inter alia, is extended to include acts and omissions of scheduled prior sellers, id., § 4.1(h)(ii). 
188 Id., § 4.1(w) (May 2005).  “Impairment” is defined to include equitable subordination.  Id. 
189 Id., § 6.1 (May 2005). 
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trade with the same standardized protections as distressed debt.  This would decrease the par 
market’s liquidity, and there would be a problematic transition period.  The exact liquidity impact is 
hard to gauge, but it appears that many claims trades fail because of an unwillingness to agree on 
purchaser protections because both parties are risk adverse.  As Chaim Fortgang and Thomas Moers 
Mayer have noted, “The importance of such representations, warranties and indemnities should not 
be underestimated.  Failure to agree on these provisions has destroyed a surprisingly large number of 
deals after claims buyers and claims sellers agreed on economic terms.”191 Equitable subordination 
is traditionally a rare and unusual remedy,192 but one that parties would nonetheless want protection 
against because it can result in a total loss.  
 Enron correctly noted that, in theory, the market price for bankruptcy claims should adjust 
itself to address this risk.193 The bankruptcy claims market, like the credit default swap and loan 
participation markets, is made up of extremely sophisticated players, who can protect themselves via 
pricing, insurance, and derivatives.  Still, one has to wonder whether the market can properly 
discount for the risk of subordination.  Parties’ natural risk aversion may lead to imperfect pricing, 
causing otherwise mutually beneficially transactions to fail, and thereby restricting liquidity in the 
claims market and thus the ability of distressed companies to raise capital.194 This is yet another way 
that Enron raises the cost of raising capital and increases financial distress for troubled companies. 
 
190 See supra note 186.  If the loan traded on par documentation when it should have traded on distressed documents, if 
the seller is willing to make “step-up” representations. See supra note 186. 
191 Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, supra note 4, at 19.    
192 Bayer, 269 F.3d at 745; Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop. by & Through Mabey (In 
re Cajun Elec. Power Coop.), 119 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 1997); United States Abatement Corp. v. Mobil Exploration & 
Producing U.S. (In re United States Abatement Corp.), 39 F.3d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1994); Austin v. Chisick (In re First 
Alliance Mortg. Co.), 298 B.R. 652, 666-67 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
193 333 B.R. at 230 n.15.  
194 Even if the market can address subordination risk overall, there will be specific mispricing, and it would take a 
significant number of discounted claims purchases for an individual purchaser to be protected properly by the market 
through diversification, even if the individual could properly quantify the risk to determine the necessary level of 
diversification.  Although insurance or derivative devices, such as an equitable subordination swap would provide 
protection, query whether such markets would develop. 
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4.  The Slippery Slope to All Capital Market Transactions 
 
Enron also creates a slippery slope that could increase counterparty risk on capital market 
transactions.  Enron noted that it also applied to pre-petition agreements to purchase a bankruptcy 
claim:   
. . . based on the Court’s previous analysis, no legal or policy basis supports the 
premise that transferees of bonds or notes should be treated differently than those 
holding the transferred loan claims.  All post-petition transferees assume the risk that 
their claims may be subject to subordination . . . . a party who enters into a pre-
petition agreement under which such party agrees to accept a transfer of proofs of 
claim in the event of the bankruptcy of a party to such agreement should fair no better 
tha[n] a post-petition purchaser of claims.195 
At first glance, this dictum is very sensible.  As long as the purchaser is aware that he is purchasing 
bankruptcy claims, it should not matter whether he agreed to purchase them before or after a 
bankruptcy petition was filed.  The purchaser has consciously assumed the same risks in both cases 
and therefore should be treated the same.   
The problem with extending Enron to pre-petition agreements to purchase bankruptcy claims 
is that a pre-petition agreement to purchase bankruptcy claims is difficult to distinguish from a 
normal pre-petition debt purchase.  A pre-petition debt purchase always includes the purchase of a 
potential bankruptcy claim if the debtor goes bankrupt.  In the case of distressed debt (or equity in a 
failing company) the likelihood of the debt or equity becoming a bankruptcy claim or interest is 
high.  Why should a vulture fund that purchases distressed debt on the eve of bankruptcy be treated 
differently than another fund that purchases claims post-petition or one that arranges pre-petition to 
purchase claims post-petition?  The intervening formality of a bankruptcy filing is not a good enough 
reason for disparate treatment.  
Once Enron is extended to pre-petition agreements to purchase bankruptcy claims, it 
becomes difficult to differentiate it from any other pre-petition debt purchase or, for that matter, 
 
195 Enron, 333 B.R. at 230 n.15.   
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from pre-petition securities or derivatives purchases.  Enron’s trajectory implicates all capital market 
transactions, and in publicly traded markets, diligence is simply impossible; indeed, that is why 
publicly traded securities are negotiable instruments, although query whether that status provides 
protection from subordination.  Whether a court would ever countenance the subordination of a 
purchaser of publicly traded security or derivative for the unrelated behavior of a virtually 
anonymous prior holder is doubtful, but Enron sets the table for such a subordination, and no 
creditor wants to be the test case.196 
So far, there has not been a noticeable market change in response to Enron, but that may 
change if it is upheld on appeal.  Diligence is likely to increase as to past holders’ identities and 
dealings with the debtor and as to sellers’ financial ability to make good on warranties or 
indemnities.  Purchase negotiations are likely to focus more on indemnities, warranties, and sureties.  
Insurance, derivatives, and structured finance solutions designed to hedge against subordination may 
even appear.  And concerned creditors are likely to seek waivers of subordination or file declaratory 
judgment actions, both of which would impose costs on bankruptcy estates.  Until Enron’s limits are 
clarified or the decision is overturned, it will create uncertainty throughout financial markets.   
C. REFCO: EARLY EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTS OF ENRON
Developments in the Refco bankruptcy provide an early look at how Enron is playing out in 
market behavior and show how seriously Enron has affected the claims trading market.  Refco shows 
that subordination risk is treated as qualitatively different from the regular business risks against 
which sophisticated actors like claims traders routinely protect themselves.  
Refco was a financial services company that ran a major commodities and futures brokerage.  
In October 2005, shortly after Refco’s IPO, its newly hired controller discovered that Refco’s CEO 
 
196 Enron also opens the door to the abusive use of equitable subordination, as a sword, and not a shield.  See In re 
Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 216 (substantive consolidation must be used as a shield, not a sword).  An expansion of 
equitable subordination would allow some creditors to squeeze out other creditors and not result in an equitable outcome.   
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and chairman had hidden some $430 million in bad debts from the company’s auditors and investors.  
These debts had been hidden by arranging for Refco to make quarterly loans to other financial 
institutions, which would then reloan the money to a company controlled by Refco’s CEO that was 
named to appear as if it were a Refco subsidiary.  This false subsidiary would then purchase the bad 
debts from Refco, using Refco’s own money in effect.  On Refco’s books, it appeared as if Refco 
was had an asset in the form of loans to creditworthy, independent financial institutions, so Refco 
was able to avoid acknowledging and writing off the bad debts, which would have left Refco with 
negative equity.  
 Refco filed for bankruptcy on October 17, 2005.  One of the intermediary institutions, the 
Austrian bank BAWAG, filed various bankruptcy claims against Refco.  In April 2006, as 
BAWAG’s involvement in Refco’s fraud came out, Refco’s creditors filed suit against BAWAG, 
creating a situation similar to Enron, in which a claimant was accused of injuring other claimants.197 
Enron expected claims potentially tainted by an inequitable creditor to continue trading with an 
appropriate risk discount.198 This is not what occurred in Refco.
As soon as there was rumor of BAWAG’s alleged misdeeds, all claims that had ever passed 
through BAWAG’s hands became radioactive, before the other Refco creditors filed suit against 
BAWAG.  No one would purchase them for any price because of the fear of subordination or 
disallowance.199 The fear of BAWAG claims was so great that reputable financial institutions took 
the drastic step of refusing to close confirmed trades in BAWAG-tainted claims.200 Holders of 
 
197 Motion, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 1103(c)(5), and 1109(b), To Authorize Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors to (I) Intervene (As a Right) in Adversary Proceeding Commenced by BAWAG and (II) Answer, Defend, and 
Prosecute Counterclaims on Behalf of Refco Group Ltd., LLC at 13, In re Refco Inc., No. 05-60006 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 21, 2006).  
198 Enron, 333 B.R. at 230 n.15. 
199 Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants’ Second Motion for Leave to Bring Interlocutory Appeal, at 
Appendix A, Exhibit 1 at 1 (Declaration of Elliot Ganz in Support of Brief of Amici Curiae), Adv. Pro. 05-01074, 05-
01105 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2006). 
200 Id.  One major broker-dealer, which has requested to remain anonymous, closed its trades in BAWAG originated 
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BAWAG claims found themselves unable to unload their positions or to mark the claims to market 
because there was no market for these claim.201 Even if these purchasers had bargained for 
indemnities, they could not collect them because no subordination had yet occurred.202 Purchasers 
that expected to be short-term claim holders found themselves trapped in positions of uncertain 
duration.203 
Normally in a commoditized market like bankruptcy claims trading, a situation like 
BAWAG’s creates a profit-rich opportunity that some party will have the risk appetite to explore; 
BAWAG claims would be so heavily discounted that there was much more profit potential.  At least 
one major financial institution, which has requested to remain anonymous, closely considered buying 
the BAWAG claims for precisely this reason and had its attorneys examine the matter.  In light of 
Enron, the attorneys could not get comfortable enough to sign off on a deal.  The subordination risk 
was too great for the financial institution to purchase the claims, regardless of the price.  Indeed, 
because there were questions about BAWAG’s own financial stability, the possibility of recourse 
against BAWAG in the event of a subordination was of little comfort to the potential purchaser.  
 What the Refco shows is that Enron is not a sui generis problem.  As Enron plays itself out in 
more cases, the market will take the subordination risk much more seriously.  Moreover, Fleet and 
BAWAG were, relatively speaking, small players.  If an agent bank, lead underwriter, or market 
maker is alleged to have acted inequitably in a future bankruptcy, it could affect a far greater 
percentage of the total dollar amount of claims on the debtor.  Although bankruptcy claims traders’ 
business involves protecting against possible risks, equitable subordination is one that these 
sophisticated market players are unwilling to chance, in part because of the soft, discretionary nature 
of the action.  Market behavior shows that Enron counterparty risk is qualitatively different from 
 
swaps on BAWAG’s debt.  Of course, if BAWAG did not default, but simply disputed its liability to purchasers of the 
subordinated debt the credit default swaps would probably not be triggered.   
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
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other risks.   
There is a coda to Refco that raises an intriguing subsidiary question.  BAWAG settled its 
claims with the Refco creditors, the Department of Justice, and the SEC for $675 million, half of 
which will go to the bankruptcy estate.204 BAWAG admitted to involvement in some of Refco’s 
schemes.205 The settlement includes mutual releases—Refco will drop its claims on the bankruptcy 
estate, and the estate and creditors will drop their claims against Refco.  This still leaves open the 
fate of claims purchased from BAWAG between Refco’s bankruptcy filing in October 2005, and the 
market freeze on BAWAG claims in April 2006.  Does the release of BAWAG cleanse its claims?  
Or are the purchasers still on the hook under Enron? The question is troubling.  Arguably, since 
BAWAG only released the claims it still had against Refco, Refco’s release should only be construed 
as extending to BAWAG itself.  BAWAG claims purchasers should garner no protection from the 
settlement.  But the settlement is also intended to make Refco and its creditors whole.  Thus, if the 
settlement were in satisfaction of any injury inflicted by BAWAG, subordination of BAWAG claims 
purchasers under Enron would be a punitive action that would result in a windfall to other creditors.  
The extent of Enron counterparty risk is only beginning to become apparent. 
D. MARKET MANIPULATION RISK IN CLAIMS TRADING 
The drastic market reaction to Enron counterparty risk creates an inverse counterparty risk in 
which sellers must fear buyers.  Enron has created the possibility of market manipulation through a 
variant of the “short-and-distort,” a mirror image “pump-and-dump.”  A potential claims purchaser 
could easily manipulate the claims market to achieve a bargain purchase by putting out word of 
inequitable behavior by claims’ originator(s), who would themselves not be harmed unless they were 
still claimholders.  A potential purchaser would not have to state any false facts; implications and 
 
203 Id.
204 Larry Neumeister, Bawag to pay $675 to settle Refco charges, AP, June 5, 2006.  
205 Dan Wilchins, BAWAG to pay $675 mln in Refco settlement, REUTERS, June 6, 2006. 
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suggestions could well do the job.  As Refco shows, even without filing a lawsuit, mere innuendo of 
creditor impropriety could cause a sharp decline in any claims that had potentially been held by that 
creditor.  Indeed, Refco shows that the claims would become unsellable . . . except to the party that 
originated the rumor, which would swoop in to buy at a steep discount.    
While a “short-and-distort” stratagem is possible in all markets, it would be far more 
effective in the claims trading market.  OTC markets like claims trading lack price stabilizers like 
specialists and market makers.  Additionally, in a regular market, negative information about a 
security will cause the security’s price to fall, but it will not usually result in a cessation of trading.  
Moreover, negative information about a publicly traded company’s operations is usually verifiable:  
Did earnings meet expectations?  Did a clinical trial fail?  Has a government investigation 
commenced?  These are black-and-white questions.  It is much harder to answer whether a company 
acted so inequitably that its claims will be subject to subordination.   
The most important distinction from other markets, though, is that existing law does not 
protect claims sellers from a short-and-distort.  Federal or state securities laws have not been applied 
to bankruptcy claims trading to date, although that could change,206 and classic common law fraud 
does not cover a short-and-distort.  In the typical fraud situation, the seller makes the 
misrepresentation to the purchaser.  In a bankruptcy claim short-and-distort, it is the purchaser that 
makes misrepresentations.  Moreover, these representations are never directly to the seller and never 
in the context of transaction negotiations.  A seller to a distorter would not be able to recover its loss 
under securities laws or common law.   
Nor would equitable subordination or claim disallowance be adequate remedies for a seller to 
a distorter.  While these remedies would have a deterrent effect against distortion, they would only 
punish the purchaser.  Subordination and disallowance do not compensate the seller, and they create 
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a windfall for other creditors.  There are no clear means of legal redress for the seller in a short-and-
distort.  At best, the seller could bring an action for unjust enrichment, but that is a hard case to make 
in an arms-length transaction between two sophisticated parties.  As claims traders start to realize the 
market manipulation risk created by Enron, the liquidity of the claims trading market is likely to 
further contract, because sellers must now also be aware of buyers.  Enron counterparty risk has thus 
come full circle, to where buyers are afraid of sellers and sellers are afraid of buyers. 
VI. REDISCOVERING THE VIRTUES OF NEGOTIABILITY 
A. WHY NEGOTIABILITY STILL MATTERS 
Enron was an erroneous decision from doctrinal and policy perspectives.  It has serious 
negative market consequences on that are only beginning to become apparent.  The key lesson from 
Enron is the continuing importance of negotiability.  For years, scholars have argued that at best, 
negotiability doesn’t matter any more, or that it is even harmful.207 It has been out of vogue with 
scholars for several decades, although the study of negotiability systems used to occupy some of the 
brightest stars in the American legal firmament:  Story, Ames, Gilmore.208 
Enron, however, shows that this fossilized branch of the law still matters today in ways no 
one previously realized.  It also raises questions about when negotiability, rather than nemo dat,
should be the default rule and what the requirements for negotiability should be.  Traditionally, these 
questions were answered in reference to the type of property interest involved.209 Some level of 
negotiability was imputed to bills of exchange and goods because these moved in the commercial 
 
206 Robert D. Drain & Elizabeth J. Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the Federal Securities Laws?, 10 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 569 (2002) (concluding that bankruptcy claims are not subject to federal securities laws). 
207 See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951, 961 
(1997) (“At least in the payment and credit contexts . . . negotiability is an outmoded and decaying relic.”) (“In this 
modern age of multiple and rapid transactions in a national and perhaps global market, negotiability’s emphasis on the 
physical document is a hindrance rather than a benefit.”); Rosenthal, supra note 49, at 401.  
208 See Larry T. Garvin, The Strange Death of Academic Commercial Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. ___ (2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=922743. 
209 Gilmore, supra note 12, at 1068. 
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world where parties were presumably more sophisticated and able to protect themselves and where 
liquidity was important.210 Choses in action—legal claims for money—which would include 
consumer debts, remained a nemo dat system because of concern for consumers losing defenses 
because of an assignment.211 As new markets have arisen, however, the traditional property type 
divisions no longer accurately reflect a consumer/commercial divide.  The remainder of this article 
considers how the law of property transfers should address evolving commercial reality in reference 
to bankruptcy claims.  
B. CAN A BANKRUPTCY CLAIM BE NEGOTIABLE?
Negotiability is a creature of state law.  Typically, UCC Article 3 determines an obligation’s 
negotiability.212 Fleet’s participation in the credit agreements with Enron was not a negotiable debt.  
A line of credit like those extended to Enron cannot met UCC Article 3's requirements because, at 
the very least, it does not involve a sum certain.213 Would it have mattered, though, if the debt 
underlying the claims purchased by the Funds was negotiable under UCC Article 3?  Would Enron 
have applied to claims based on negotiable debts?  If so, then a bankruptcy claim can never be 
negotiable.  If not, Enron would mean that what is negotiable at state law remains negotiable in 
bankruptcy.  
 Enron’s ruling that the Funds could not be good faith purchasers because they were 
purchasing bankruptcy claims214 means that negotiability under state law is not honored in 
 
210 Id. 
211 Traditionally consumer debtors bargained in part for a relationship with a specific creditor.  A consumer who struck a 
deal with a creditor he knows to be laid back wouldn’t want to find his debt resold to a loan shark.  In this day and age of 
securitization of consumer debt obligations, though, consumers can no longer expect that their debts will remain in the 
hands of the originating creditor.   
212 UCC § 3-102 (1991); UCC §  3-103 (1951).  Article 3 does not cover money; payment orders governed by UCC 
Article 4A; documents of title, governed by UCC Article 7; and investment securities, governed by UCC Article 8.  UCC 
§ 3-104(1951) and Comment 2 to UCC § 304 (1991) however, indicating that it is possible for there to negotiable 
instruments outside of Article 3.  See Gilmore, supra note 12, at 1108.  But see UCC § 3-805 (1951) (UCC Article 3 
applies to some instruments that do not meet § 3-104 negotiability requirements). 
213 UCC § 3-104 (1991). 
214 Enron, 333 B.R. at 235. 
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bankruptcy.  Although the claims might have been negotiable, negotiability has no meaning if there 
cannot be a good faith purchaser.  Enron imposed a different standard of good faith for the purchase 
of a bankruptcy claim than for the purchase of the underlying debt.  The original UCC, still in force 
in forty-six states, defines good faith as “honesty in fact,”215 while the revised UCC, adopted by 
three states so far, defines it as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing.”216 In either case, the Funds would have easily qualified as good faith 
purchasers.  Enron means that state law treatment of negotiability and good faith does not carry over 
into bankruptcy.   
 As a general matter, though, state law property rights are respected in bankruptcy.  As the 
Supreme Court noted in Butner v. United States, “Property interests are created and defined by state 
law.  Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests 
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.”217 Thus, security interests, determined by UCC Article 9—state law—are given force 
in bankruptcy, albeit with some limitations.218 It makes little sense, then, that UCC Article 3’s 
definition of certain property interests would not also be respected in bankruptcy. 
Butner failed to recognized, however, that not all property rights are creations of state law.  
Some property rights, like copyrights, patents, and federal judgments, are creations only of federal 
law.  Likewise, bankruptcy claims involve property rights that are the creation of federal, not state 
law.219 A bankruptcy claim is different from the underlying debt.  The Bankruptcy Code’s definition 
of “claim” is broader than a debt.  The Code defines a “claim” as a 
 (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
 
215 UCC § 1-201(19) (1951).  
216 UCC § 1-201(20) (2001) (emphasis added).   
217 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
218 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2006) (the strong-arm powers of trustee mean that security interests have to hold up against a 
hypothetical, not an actual rival creditor).   
219 See generally Levitin, supra note 78, at 71-74, regarding bankruptcy as a uniquely federal interest. 
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equitable, secured, or unsecured; or 
 
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to 
a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to 
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or 
unsecured.220 
A claim includes disputed, contingent, and unliquidated payment obligations.  Thus, a bankruptcy 
claim does not need an underlying enforceable pre-petition debt.  Nor does simply holding a debt 
create a bankruptcy claim.  A claim must be timely filed with the court,221 and post-petition transfers 
of the claim must also be registered with the court.222 
A bankruptcy claim also differs from a pre-petition debt in terms of the relationships it 
implicates.  The voting system for Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 plans223 means that creditors are not 
simply in a bilateral relationship with the debtor.  Instead, they become part of a multilateral 
involuntary community of creditors, so claims trades and the relative priority of claims have an 
impact on third parties.  The relational aspect of a bankruptcy claim, as well as its more expansive 
definition and filing requirements, distinguish it from a pre-petition debt.  
 Finally, while the property rights involved in a debt are a product of state law, there are 
additional rights that vest in a bankruptcy claim that exist only as a matter of federal law.  A 
bankruptcy claim entitles its holder to plan disclosure and voting rights, distribution rights, and rights 
to bring actions under Bankruptcy Code provisions.  To be sure, a pre-petition obligation also 
includes a package of bankruptcy rights,224 but those rights attach as a matter of federal, not state 
 
220 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2006). 
221 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006). 
222 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e)(2) (2006). 
223 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1329 (2006). 
224 Justice Holmes famously observed that “The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must 
pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 462 (1897).   Justice Holmes, however, wrote in 1897, when there was no bankruptcy law in the United States.  Had 
he written a year later, he might have described the duty to keep a contract as a prediction that you must pay damages if 
you do not keep it or file for bankruptcy and pay damages in bankruptcy at cents on the dollar. See also Elizabeth 
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 778-779 (1987).  Bankruptcy is now the background term to every 
contract, to every debt, to all obligations and relationships in society, excluding those few with parties denied bankruptcy 
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law.  Federal bankruptcy law displaces state collection law upon the granting of an order for relief.225 
Therefore, it should not matter whether the debt underlying a bankruptcy claim was negotiable or 
not.  Federal law should govern the treatment of bankruptcy claims.    
 Enron mandated a uniform federal rule of non-negotiability of bankruptcy claims that means 
state law negotiability status has no impact in bankruptcy because there cannot be good faith claims 
purchasers to benefit from negotiability’s protections.  While Enron was correct in intuiting that 
federal law should govern the transfer of bankruptcy claims, it erred in what that law should be, and 
that error has had significant negative impacts on capital markets.  This article proposes a federal law 
of negotiability for corporate bankruptcy claims that will overturn Enron and protect the liquidity of 
the corporate bankruptcy claims market.226 
C. A PROPOSED FEDERAL LAW OF NEGOTIABILITY FOR BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS 
A federal law of negotiability for bankruptcy claims could be accomplished in three ways.  
First, § 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code could be amended to include § 510(c) in its list of actions for 
which § 550(b) provides a good faith purchaser defense.  A legislative solution would have the 
virtues of being immediate and uniform.  Alternatively, either Congress or the courts could define 
bankruptcy claims could be as securities, which would lend them negotiability, but would impose 
onerous regulatory burdens on the market.   
 A third way would be for courts to craft a federal common law of negotiability of bankruptcy 
claims.  Because Congress has not addressed the issue directly, there is room of the courts to create a 
federal common law of bankruptcy claims trading that presumes negotiability of claims, regardless 
of formalities.227 Indeed, Enron itself was federal common lawmaking.   
 
relief, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 727(a)(8)-(9) (2006), or those obligations that are non-dischargeable.  See 11 U.S.C. § 523 
(2006). 
225 See Levitin, supra note 78, at 72. 
226 As observed in note 1, supra, personal bankruptcy claims trading raises different policy issues, and nemo dat is 
probably not appropriate outside of a commercial context.   
227 See Levitin, supra note 78, at 66-77, regarding federal common law in bankruptcy.  
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Federal common law would not yield immediate or necessarily uniform results.  But it might 
produce a more nuanced rule over time than a legislative solution. The danger of codification of 
negotiable instrument law, as Grant Gilmore recognized, is that codification frequently becomes “a 
strait jacket to confine” new types of commercial activity.228 
The proposed rule would presume good faith in most bankruptcy claims purchases under an 
“honesty in fact and reasonable standards of commercial dealing” standard like the revised UCC.229 
The exceptions to this presumption would be claims trading by fiduciaries of the estate, resale-
sellbacks, and situations in which the claims’ purchaser had acquired the claims along with 
substantially all assets of the former holder.  For good faith claims purchasers, the rule would cut-off 
other “personal” defenses and attacks, including equitable subordination, by other creditors and the 
estate against good faith purchasers of bankruptcy claims.  
 The proposed rule would not cut off the estate’s defenses with the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition.  Rather, if the claim is based on what was a negotiable debt at state law, then those state law 
protections should continue to apply to a creditor who acquired the claim before bankruptcy.  Thus, 
if a creditor who acquired a pre-petition would be a holder in due course under state law, he should 
have the same protection under bankruptcy law.  On the other hand, if the creditor purchased a non-
negotiable debt pre-bankruptcy, he should not get the protections of a holder in due course, even if 
he would qualify had the debt been negotiable at state law.  The post-petition transferee of either of 
these creditors, however, should take the claim free of personal defenses, to which equitable 
subordination may be added.     
 The proposed rule would not require any formalities for negotiability to attach.  A federal 
rule of negotiability for bankruptcy claims would dispense with the need to make claims conform to 
formal requirements.  UCC Article 3’s formal requirements are designed to provide notice of the 
 
228 Gilmore, supra note 12, at 1107. 
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negotiable status of the debt.  No such notice is needed, however, in a market occupied solely by 
sophisticated players, like bankruptcy claims trading.  If there is a bright-line rule, the parties will be 
aware of it.  Thus, even reification, the merger of the debt and the instrument, which has traditionally 
been the crucial step for negotiability,230 is not needed.  Indeed, as Ronald Mann has noted, “In this 
modern age of multiple and rapid transactions in a national and perhaps global market, 
negotiability’s emphasis on the physical document is a hindrance, rather than a benefit.”231 
In the end, negotiability is not about reification, so much as it is about what defenses travel 
with a claim.  This has gotten lost in the formalist emphasis of UCC Article 3, the chief body of 
negotiability law, which made reification the essential precondition for negotiability.  Nearly thirty 
years ago, Grant Gilmore observed that “Article 3 is a museum of antiquities—a treasure house 
crammed full of ancient artifacts whose use and function have long since been forgotten.  Another 
function of codification . . . is to preserve the past, like a fly in amber.”232 Unfortunately, the 
formalisms of negotiability make it easy to miss the forest for the trees.  The concerns that animated 
so much of past property transfer law—theft and forgery of instruments and indorsements—are 
sideshows today.  Indeed, with electronic transactions, reification simply is not possible.  
Although the hallmark of negotiable instrument law has long been its formal requirements, 
that need not be the case.  Indeed, Gilmore, himself a skilled draftsman, observed that it would be 
possible to draft a negotiable instrument law without reference to formal requisites.233 If codification 
is the handmaiden of ossification, then it is to the living common law that we should look for 
keeping commercial law in line with commercial practice. 
Article 3 of the UCC provides a notable contrast to Article 2.  UCC Article 2 was drafted 
primarily by Karl Llewellyn.  Llewellyn had “reverence, above all other judges, for Lord Mansfield,” 
 
229 UCC § 1-201(20) (2001). 
230 Gilmore, supra note 12, at 1077. 
231 See Mann, supra note 207, at 961. 
232 Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 461 (1979). 
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the great 18th century English jurist.234 Lord Mansfield was particularly noted for using special 
juries of merchants to determine prevailing commercial practices.235 As Edwin Rubin has noted, “In 
the view of Llewellyn and his fellow realists, the law should be grounded on real business practices, 
not formal concepts–precisely the approach that Mansfield championed.”236 This is best illustrated 
in UCC 1-201(20)’s definition of “good faith” as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing.”237 Article 3, however, does not contain such an attachment of 
living commercial practice.  As Rubin has observed, “The rules that both Original Article 3 and its 
revision promulgate are Lord Mansfield’s, by and large, but his method of deriving such rules from 
the commercial realities of the day has been forgotten.”238 
Enron should cause us to rethink whether property transfer law needs to be revised in some 
areas to keep up with commercial reality.  In particular, we should ask whether the formalities of 
Article 3 negotiability, including reification, make sense today.  If their chief purpose is to give 
notice that a particular legal rule applies, we should ask whether the market is already on notice of 
that rule, especially in light of the high transaction costs to Article 3’s formal requirements.  The 
formal requirements of Article 3 make negotiability an opt-in system that is impractical for many 
types of commercial transactions.  The formalities required for Article 3 negotiability limit parties’ 
contracting choices; loosening the formal requirements of negotiability when it would not come at 
the expense of obligors or assignees would allow for contracts to better reflect parties actual, more 
nuanced preferences, rather than force an outdated binary choice upon them.  While relatively few 
commercial transaction are negotiable today, this does not mean that parties do not want the liquidity 
benefits of negotiability, only that the costs of the statutory formalities are too high. 
 
233 Gilmore, supra note 12, at 1072.  
234 Gilmore, supra note 232, at 460-461. 
235 Edwin L. Rubin, Learning from Lord Mansfield: Toward a Transferability Law for Modern Commercial Practice, 31 
IDAHO L. REV. 775, 780 (1995). 
236 Id. at 787.   
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The law has long evinced a preference for negotiability in commercial cases, particularly 
when involving sophisticated parties because the liquidity benefits of negotiability outweigh its costs 
to obligors in these cases since the obligors are capable of protecting themselves through pricing and 
litigation.  As commercial markets develop, it is important that the proper property transfer 
paradigm—negotiability or nemo dat—be applied, and that this application revolve around the 
realities of the market, not outdated formalities.  
Bankruptcy claims are a case where the social value of market liquidity greatly outweighs the 
social interest in protecting obligors.  This is because liquidity in the claims market affects the cost 
of borrowing in all markets.  Moreover, the obligor—the bankruptcy estate—is not really a party in 
interest—only other creditors are, but, at least in theory, they all enjoy the possibility of higher resale 
prices.  The direct benefits of negotiability for bankruptcy claims will not accrue to all creditors 
equally.  Creditors with small claims—usually individuals with wage or benefit claims or tort 
judgment claims—are unlikely to be able to sell their claims because the transaction costs are too 
high for the additional control benefit.  It will be large finance and trade creditors that reap the 
benefits of negotiability in terms of increased resale price, while distressed debt investors—usually 
sophisticated banks or hedge funds—will receive the benefit of claims with limited defenses.  But 
there is a larger social benefit that accrues to all creditors—the decreased bankruptcy risk of 
borrowers because increased liquidity in the claims market will exert downward pressure on the cost 
of capital outside of bankruptcy.  A federal rule of negotiability for bankruptcy claims would ensure 
a fair, efficient, and liquid market in bankruptcy claims that makes it easier for distressed companies 
to raise funds and lower borrowers’ bankruptcy risks.   
VI. CONCLUSION: EQUITY IS A ROGUISH THING
238 Rubin, supra note 235, at 795 (emphasis original). 
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Enron is cause to consider what risks one takes with an assignment, and whether those risks 
should include equitable subordination for behavior by parties up the chain of assignment unrelated 
to the assignment.  Is it realistic to hold assignees responsible for investigating not just asset being 
purchased or even the chain of assignment, but also the actions of previous holders unrelated to the 
assignment?  Such a requirement crimps liquidity and transparency in the bankruptcy claims market.  
It is also unnecessary because creditors never rely on priority resulting from equitable subordination 
in their decisions to extend value and can bring direct actions against the malfeasor if they or the 
bankruptcy estate has been harmed.  
Over four hundred years ago, John Selden observed that “Equity is a roguish thing.”239 But 
equity is only roguish when it becomes detached from its guiding principles.  Enron erred as a 
doctrinal matter by failing to recognize that the law’s choice of property transfer system— nemo dat 
or negotiability—is based on protection of justified reliance.  As a policy matter, too, Enron erred, 
by failing to recognize that hobbling of liquidity in the bankruptcy claims market has serious 
spillover effects into other markets and raises the cost of credit for borrowers, which exacerbates 
bankruptcy risk for creditors.  
Enron is a reminder of the continuing value of negotiability in commercial contexts and the 
need to keep the law of property transfers in sync with evolving commercial reality.  Bankruptcy law 
is still adjusting to the development of a large-scale claims trading market over the past two decades.  
The problems of claims trading deserve serious consideration, but any attempt to regulate claims 
trading needs to recognize the importance of the bankruptcy claims market for the economy as a 
whole.   A federal law of negotiability for bankruptcy claims would do so by protecting the liquidity 
of a vital market and should be strongly considered by courts and Congress in the wake of Enron.
239 SELDEN, supra note 97, at 43. 
